1	IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
2	
3	
4	a a
5	THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) Supreme Court No.
6	Plaintiff-Respondent, )
7	VS COURT REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
8	THOMAS EUGENE CREECH,
9	Defendant-Appellant.
10	
11	
12	
13	BEFORE
14	HOHORABLE J. PAY DURTSCHI
15	DISTRICT JUDGE
16	
17	
18	
19	APPEAL from the District Court of the First
20	Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
21	County of Shoshone.
22	
23	
24	
25	

## APPEARANCES

WAYNE KIDWELL, Esq. Attorney General of the State of Idaho, Capitol Building, Boise, Idaho, for and on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent.

BRUCE O. ROBINSON, Esq., Post Office Box 8, Nampa, Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of the defendant-appellant.

- 1	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT		
2	OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE		
3			
4			
5			
6	THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) Cr. No. 2165		
7	Plaintiff, )		
8	vs ) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT		
9	THOMAS EUGENE CREECH, )		
10	Defendant. )		
11			
12			
13	BEFORE		
14	HONORABLE J. RAY DURTSCHI		
15	DISTRICT JUDGE		
16			
17			
18	BE IT REMEMBERED, That the above-entitled matter came		
19	on for hearing and trial before the Honorable J. Ray Durtschi,		
20	District Judge, with a jury, at Cascade, Idaho, May 20, 1975		
21	through May 22, 1975, and at Mallace, Idaho, October 6, 1975		
22	through October 22, 1975.		
23			
24			
25	á .		

OHN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise Idaho 83705

## APPEARANCES

ROBERT REMAKLUS, Esq., Prosecuting Attorney, Cascade, Idaho, and

LYNN THOMAS, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of the plaintiff.

BRUCE O. ROBINSON, Esq., Post Office Box 8, Nampa, Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of the defendant, and

WARD HOWER, Esq., Post Office Box 799, Cascade, Idaho, appearing for and on behalf of the defendant.

JOHN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise idaho 83705 2a

1	IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT		
2	OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SHOSHONE		
3			
4			
5	THE STATE OF IDAMO, ) Cr. No. 2165		
6	Plaintiff-Respondent, ) LODGMENT OF COURT		
7	VS ) REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ) ON APPEAL		
8	THOMAS EUGENE CREECH,		
9	Defendant-Appellant. )		
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15	RECEIVED from John W. Gambee, Official Court Reporter		
16	of the above-entitled court, and lodged with me this day		
17	of, 1976, original plus copies of		
18	the Court Reporter's Transcript on Appeal.		
19			
20			
21			
22	CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT		
23			
24	Deputy		
25			
1			

JOHN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boic\* Idaho 83705

1	KATHY SPAULDING,
2	a witness on behalf of the State, having been first duly sworn
3	for rebuttal examination, took the stand and testified as follows:
4	
5	DIRECT EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. REMAKLUS:
7	Q. State your name, please.
8	A. Kathy Spaulding.
9	Q. I want you to speak up so all the jurors can hear
10	you, now, Miss Spaulding.
11	Where do you live, Miss Spaulding?
12	8. Lewiston, Idaho.
13	0. And how long have you lived at Lewiston?
14	A. Seven years.
15	O And are you the sister to Carol Spaulding?
16	a. Yes, I am.
17	O And what is your address in Lewiston?
18	A 2404 Eighth Avenue.
19	@ And who lives at that address?
20	My mother and my brother and Bill Schreiber.
21	0. And were you directing your attention to the
22	3rd day of November, 1974, were you at Lewiston, Idaho?
23	A. No, I was in Spokane, Washington.
24	And what were you doing in Spokane on that day?
25	. I went to the World's Fair.

1		
1	Q.	Who did you go with?
2	h.,	Mrs. Knutson and her three daughters.
3	Ü	And from where did you go to the World's Fair?
4	ja.	From Lewiston.
5	()	So, you were in Lewiston in the morning. What
6	time did you	leave for the Fair; do you remember?
7	Ā.	Oh, early, about 8:00 or 9:00.
8	Q	And whose car did you go in?
9	Z.	Mrs. Knutson's.
10	Q.	And did you spend all day at the Fair?
11	ā.	Yes, we did.
12	Q.	Do you remember about when you got home from the
13	Fair?	
14	A.	About 9:30 that night.
15	Q.	And did you go right home that evening?
16	A.	Yes.
17	Q.	Did Mrs. Knutson take you home?
18	A.	Yes, she did.
19	Q.	What, if anything, did you do after you got home,
20	Miss Spauldi	ing?
21	Α.	Her two daughters came in to visit me for a few
22	minutes and	they went home and I went to bed.
23	Q.	Where did the Knutsons live; do you know?
24	Α.	2502 Eighth Avenue. It's about three houses up
25	from where v	we live.

1	
1	Q That's there in Lewiston, Idaho?
2	A. Yes.
3	Q. After the girls went home, what, if anything, did
4	you do?
5	A. I went to bed.
6	Q. And did you stay home all night?
7	A. Yes.
8	Ω Do you remember, thinking back to the next day,
9	can you do you remember what you did the next day?
10	A. I went to school.
11	Q. And what time did you ordinarily get up to go to
12	school, Miss Spaulding?
13	A. 7:00.
14	Q. Are you acquainted with Dan Carey?
15	e Yes, I am.
16	O Did you see him on the 3rd November 3rd?
17	A Ro.
18	Q. Were you did you go down to the vicinity of
19	Donnelly, Idaho, on the night of November 3rd, 1974?
20	A. No, I didn't.
21	Q. Were you present or participate in the killings of
22	Tom Arnold and Wayne Bradford?
23	A, No.
24	MR. REMAKLUS: You may examine.
25	

1	CROSS EXAMINATION	
2	BY MR. ROBINSON:	
3	Q. Kathy, were you with your sister Carol, Dan and	
4	Tom on November the 2nd?	
5	A. No, I wasn't.	
6	Q. Do you recall where you were that day?	
7	A. I was at the World's Fair.	
8	Q. On Saturday the 2nd?	
9	A. Oh, no yeah, I saw Tom and Carol and Dan on	
10	Saturday the 2nd.	
11	Q. All right. And they went over to Clarkston on that	
12	day. Were you with them on that day?	
13	A. No, I stayed home that day.	
14	Q And did you return or when they returned from	
15	Clarkston did you go with them to the park?	
16	A. No.	
17	Q. Do you own a "bird shirt", a shirt that had birds	
18	on it?	
19	A. Yes.	
20	MR. REMAKLUS: Object on the ground it's outside the	
21	direct examination, Your Honor.	
22	THE COURT: Overruled. The answer may stand.	
23	THE WITNESS: Yes, I give it to my sister.	
24	Q. BY MR. ROBINSON: You gave that shirt that had	
25	birds on it to Carol?	

1	A. Yes.
2	Q. When did you give that shirt to her?
3	A. Before she left, Saturday.
4	Q. And did you give it to her on Saturday? She had
5	that with her in her trip south to Boise?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q Do you smoke pot?
8	MR. REMAKLUS: Object on the grounds this is outside the
9	direct examination, Your Honor. It has no bearing on the
10	issues in this case.
11	THE COURT: Overruled.
12	Q. BY MR. ROBINSON: You may answer.
13	A. Yes, I have smoked grass.
14	Q. And during this weekend of November the 2nd and 3rd,
15	1974, did you smoke pot or grass on that weekend?
16	A. No.
17	Q. Kathy, did you actually tell your mother that you
18	were going to Expo '74 in Spokane?
19	A. Yes, I did.
20	Q. And go elsewhere?
21	A. No.
22	Q. You did go to the World's Fair?
23	A. Yes.
24	Q. What are the names of those three daughters of
25	Mrs. Knutson's?
1	

1	A. Pam Anderson, Lisa Anderson and Judy Anderson.
2	Q Now, were you pretty much free to come and go as
3	you wished at that time?
4	MR. REMAKLUS: I'm going to object again outside of the
5	scope of the direct examination, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Overruled.
7	THE WITNESS: Yes.
8	MR. ROBINSON: I have nothing further.
9	MR. REMAKLUS: You may step down.
10	May Miss Spaulding be excused?
11	MR. ROBINSON: As far as the Defense is concerned she
12	may.
13	THE COURT: You may leave if you wish to.
14	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15	MR. REMAKLUS: Call Mrs. Knutson.
16	
17	MYRTLE KNUTSON,
18	called as a witness on behalf of the State, being first duly
19	sworn on rebuttal examination, took the stand and testified as
20	follows:
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

1	DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. REMAKLUS:
3	
4	0. Would you state your name, please.
5	ä Myrtle Knutson.
	O And where do you live, Mrs. Knutson?
6	h Lewiston, Idaho.
7	0. How long have you lived there?
8	a. Since 1963.
9	And are you employed?
10	A Yes, I am.
11	0 And by whom?
12	Nez Perce County.
13	Q And what is your job?
14	A. I'm a Deputy Assessor.
15	Q. How long have you been a Deputy Assessor?
16	A. A little over ten years.
17	Q. And what is your street address in Lewiston,
18	Mrs. Knutson?
19	E 2502 Eighth Avenue.
20	And do you know Kathy Spaulding?
21	Yes, I do.
22	And do you know where she lives?
23	Yes. She lives down the street. I don't recall
24	the exact house number, about three houses down.
25	@ Three housed down from your house?
	**

1	Ä.	Yes, right.
2	Miles Art	
	Ω	And do you have children?
3	<u>.</u>	Yes, I do.
4	Ö	And what are their names?
5	ů.	George Anderson, Judy Anderson, Pam Anderson and
6	Lisa Anders	on.
7	0	They live with you?
8	k.	Judy and George Anderson are in Anchorage, Alaska.
9	Ū.	And Pam and Lisa live with you?
10	Ü	The two oldest are 23 and 21, so they are out on
11	their own.	
12	e	Um-hmm. And how old are the other two?
13	ž.	Fifteen and sixteen.
14	Ω.	Directing your attention to the 3rd day of
15	November, 1	974, can you tell us what, if anything, you did on
16	that date?	
17	A	Yes, I was to the World's Fair in Spokane.
18	Q.	How do you establish that date, Mrs. Knutson?
19	Ā.	Well, it was the last day and it was a Sunday and
20	it was the	last chance we had to go.
21	Q.	And did anyone accompany you to the World's Fair
22	that day?	
23	ي د د د د	Yes, they did, my daughter Judy, Pam, Lisa and
24	Kathy Spaul	ding.
25	Q.	And did you take your car?
		•

1	Ä,	Yes, I did.
2	0	Did you drive it?
3	ş	Yes, I drove.
4	Q.	Do you remember what time you left Lewiston for the
5	World's Fai	
6	A.	I would say in the vicinity of 8:00 in the morning.
7	Q.	And that was the World's Fair in Spokane, Washington?
8	Α.	That's correct.
9	Q.	Did you go right from Lewiston to the Fair,
10	Mrs. Knutso	n?
11	P.,	Yes, we did.
12	Q.	How long did you spend at the Fair? Do you have
13	any idea?	
14	А.	We were there all day, I would say it was getting
15	dark when w	e left up there and we arrived home around 9:30
16	in the even	ing.
17	Q.	And what, if anything, did you do when you arrived
18	home?	
19	A.	I dropped Kathy off at her house and the girls
20	went down to	o visit her.
21	ũ.	Those are your daughters?
22	B.	Judy and Pam and Lisa, sorry.
23	Ú	Went to visit Kathy?
24	P	Right.
25	ΰ	Well, what time of day did you say that was?

	1)		
1		Α,	That evening?
2		Q.	Yes.
3		A.	We got home around 9:30, I would say it was
4	around	10:0	0 or such a matter in that time.
5		Q.	And when was the last time you saw Kathy that
6	evening	g, Ka	thy Spaulding?
7		Α.	When I dropped her off; which would be around
8	9:30.		
9		MR.	REMAKLUS: I have no further questions.
10			
11	ì		CROSS EXAMINATION
12	BY MR.	ROBI	NSON:
13		Q.	Mrs. Knutson, how many times during 1974 did you
14	attend	the	Expo '74?
15		A.	That was the only time.
16		Q.	And you specifically recall that this date was the
17	last we	eeken	d of Expo '74?
18		A.	Yes, I do.
19		Q.	And is there anything else that sets in your mind
20	that i	t was	the weekend of November the 2nd and 3rd?
21		A.	Well, it was the last day of the Fair.
22	7.0	Q.	All right. And have you checked, yourself, as to
23	whether	ror	not the last day of the Fair was November 2nd or
24	3rd or	the	last weekend in October?
25		A.	Well, maybe not specifically, but I think Sunday

1 sleeping on. 2 And did you see her there sleeping that night? 0. 3 A. Oh, yes. 4 Do you have any idea what time that would have been, 5 Mr. Schreiber? 6 Well, it must have been anywhere past 10:30, 7 10:30 to 11:00 when I went to bed. 8 What is your habit or custom to do in the evenings? 9 Well, after I go to bed I usually have a bunch of A. 10 magazines there and I read until about 3:00 -- well, when the 11 mill whistle blows that's when shift changes and at 3:00 I 12 turn out the light or, if there's just a little bit of a story 13 left I finish it and, maybe, 3:30. But, it's never before then. 14 I always am awake until 3:00. 15 Directing your attention to the night of 16 November the 3rd and the early morning hours of November 4, 17 1974, did you do that same customary thing? 18 Well, I always do it. I'm positive I did because A. 19 that's my habit every night. I never miss a night doing that 20 because I can't go to sleep right when I go to bed and I always 21 read until 3:00, until the mill whistle blows. 22 Which whistle is this? 0. 23 Potlatch Forest mill whistle there. It's about a 24 mile and a half from us. 25 O. And you can hear?

1 MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you, Mr. Schreiber. 2 Your Honor, we have additional witnesses that don't 3 appear to be in the courtroom. I'm wondering if we could have 4 a brief recess. They are on their way into court. 5 THE COURT: We will take a short recess, then, ladies 6 and gentlemen. If you will remember the admonition, don't 7 discuss the case and keep your minds open. 8 (Recess taken.) 9 THE COURT: Show the jurors are all present. 10 MR. REMAKLUS: Mrs. Smith, would you step forward to 11 be sworn, please. 12 13 CHARLOTTE SMITH, 14 a witness on behalf of the State, having been first duly sworn for rebuttal examination, took the stand and testified 15 16 as follows: 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	
	DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. REMAKLUS:
3	Would you state your name, please.
4	A. Charlotte Smith.
5	0 What kind turn so the jury can hear you, please,
6	Mrs. Smith.
7	Where do you live?
8	A. 1329 Fifth Street, Clarkston, Washington.
9	Q Is that just across the river from Lewiston, Idaho?
10	8. Right, just across the bridge.
11	0. And do you have any children?
12	M Yes, I have three sons.
13	Q. And what are their names, please?
14	A. Mike is my oldest son, he's 22, Dan is my middle
15	son, he is 20 and I have a 13-year old son, Jeff.
16	Q And what are their last names?
17	A. Mike and Dan's last name are both Carey.
18	0. You are the mother of Dan Carey?
19	yes.
20	O. And are you employed, Mrs. Smith?
21	No, I'm a housewife and mother.
22	And you were directing your attention to the
23	2nd and 3rd days of November, 1974, were you at home there in
24	Clarkston, Washington?
25	A. Yes, I was.

1	A. That's my other son's birthday and, so, I know
2	what day it was then, too.
3	Q. And did you take Danny to school that morning?
4	MR. ROBINSON: Object, repetitious.
5	THE COURT: Yes, I'll sustain the objection.
6	MR. REMAKLUS: Excuse me.
7	THE WITNESS: I also picked him up at 3:00.
8	MR. ROBINSON: Objection to the answer
9	THE COURT: I'll strike the volunteered statement and
10	instruct you to disregard it, ladies and gentlemen.
11	Just wait until questions are asked.
12	Q. BY MR. REMAKLUS: Mrs. Smith, is your son Dan
13	Carey that you are referring to present in the courtroom?
14	A. Yes, he is. Sitting right down there in the front
15	row.
16	MR. REMAKLUS: Could we have your son stand up, please.
17	Dan Carey.
18	O. BY MR. REMAKLUS: Is that your son Dan Carey that
19	you are referring to?
20	A. Yes, it is.
21	MR. REMAKLUS: I have no further questions.
22	MR. ROBINSON: No questions, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: You may step down.
24	MR. REMAKLUS: May this witness be excused?
25	MR. ROBINSON: As far as we're concerned, yes.

1	THE COURT: Yes, you may be excused if you wish to leave
2	Mrs. Smith.
3	MR. REMAKLUS: Like to call Dr. J. H. Treleaven.
4	
5	JOSEPH HERBERT TRELEAVEN,
6	called as a witness on behalf of the State, being first duly
7	sworn for rebuttal examination, took the witness stand and
8	testified as follows:
9	
10	DIRECT EXAMINATION
11	BY MR. REMAKLUS:
12	Q. Would you state your full name, please, Doctor.
13	A. Joseph Herbert Treleaven.
14	Q And where do you live, Doctor?
15	3. Salem, Oregon.
16	And what is your occupation?
17	a. I'm a physician specializing in psychiatry.
18	0. And by whom are you employed?
19	The State of Oregon, Oregon State Hospital.
20	Q. And how long have you been so employed, Doctor?
21	5 For the last time about nine years.
22	0. And is that the Oregon State Hospital there in
23	Salem, Oregon?
24	5. Yes, that's correct.
25	Q Doctor would you give us a summary of your
WW. C.	

1	0 BY MR. REMAKLUS: Doctor, when did you first meet				
2	Mr. Creech?				
3	on April the 9th, 1974.				
4	0. Where?				
5	A. At the Oregon State Hospital.				
6	And what then was the purpose of that meeting?				
7	A. He was sent to the hospital by a District Court				
8	Judge in Multnomah County in the Portland area for an examination				
9	and for treatment while he was under indictment for some				
10	criminal charges,				
11	Q Did you make a psychiatric evaluation of him at				
12	that time?				
13	A. Yes, I did.				
14	Q. And what did you do what kind of an evaluation				
15	did you make? Would you explain that, please?				
16	A. Well, our evaluation consists of several				
17	psychiatric interviews and observation on our psychiatric				
18	security unit where we do all of the medical-legal psychiatric				
19	examinations for the State.				
20	Persons under observation by our specialists, our				
21	trained aides and nurses; as well as myself and the person has				
22	a complete physical examination and there is some routine				
23	laboratory tests that we run.				
24	Q And after these tests were run, you made your				
25	examination, did you arrive at any conclusion as to the mental				

Yes, I did. I should add one thing; that all of our medical-legal examinations are reviewed by a staff of senior psychiatrists at the hospital, we call the Disposition Board, which I consider part of the examination too.

- And who's on this Board, Doctor?
- All of the experienced psychiatrists that work on the psychiatric security unit and the superintendent of the
  - And how many doctors would that be?
  - Oh, it usually runs about five or six.
- What diagnosis, if any, did you make of this

It was my opinion at that time that Mr. Creech warranted two diagnoses, one was an antisocial personality and the other was a possible psychoneurotic reaction, hysterical-type and conversion symptoms, which consisted of anxiety and difficulty in breathing; especially when he found himself in an

Did you find any evidence of mental illness or

I'm not sure I know what you mean by that question. The psychoneurosis is a mild-type of mental abnormality --

-- but, I didn't find any evidence of psychosis if

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19 20

21

22

23

25

24

you, Doctor?

A. Yes, I do. I have them right here. I should say that he was again presented to the Hospital Disposition Board where I was present and reviewed his case on May 30, 1974 prior to transferring him from the maximum security of the hospital to the open section of the hospital. So, I reviewed his case again at that time.

- And what -- what did you determine at that time?
- Well, we determined that the diagnoses were essentially the same as before. One of the doctors that examined him on the second admission added, "depressive neurosis" to the diagnosis based on the history of him being depressed while he was in jail. But, otherwise we found him essentially the same as when we first examined him in April of 174.
- Then, there was no -- you determined no evidence of mental disease or defect at that time; is that correct?
  - A. Not other than those conditions I mentioned.
- And was the -- would you define the last term that you just used on the depressive --
- Well, I think the easiest way to look at it is, most of us get depressed from time to time and depressed neurosis is just when you get depressed enough that you feel very unhappy, or very uncomfortable and you may or may not be able to carry on with your normal functioning; in contrast to

a psychotic depression where you become so depressed that you
think the world is coming to an end or that you committed the
unpardonable sin and you lose contact with reality. That's
the difference.
Q. And there was no psychotic depression here?
ė. No.
Q And when do your records show that this defendant
was discharged from the hospital?
A. On June the 20th, 1974.
Q And what was his final diagnosis at that time?
A. Final diagnosis was, again, antisocial personality
disorder and neurosis, hysterical conversion-type. So, he
left with the initial two diagnoses that I gave him on the
first admission.
Q. And do you have copies of the hospital records
with you?
A. Yes, I do.
Q Are they photocopies, Doctor?
A. Yes, they are.
MR. REMAKLUS: May I have them, please.
Those are so voluminous I don't think I'll ask to
have them marked.
You may examine, Mr. Robinson.

THE COURT: Yes.

- Q. BY MR. ROBINSON: Doctor, I hand you what's been marked now as Defendant's Exhibit No. N and ask you whether or not that is the written report, the first two pages that you first referred to, dated April 25, 1974 and the other pages being the case summary, psychosocial history and release summary?
- A. Excuse me, you missed the psychosocial history and that's here. Do you want it too?
  - Q. Yes, please, Doctor.
  - A. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
- Q. Then, what you now have in your hand is the complete document that we were referring to that I asked you for; is that correct?
  - A. That's correct.

MR. ROBINSON: And with the Court's permission, I'll have those two pages attached to the back and I move the admission.

THE COURT: Yes, they may be made a part of the Exhibit N so it is complete.

MR. ROBINSON: All right, sir, and I move the admission of Defendant's Exhibit No. N.

MR. REMAKLUS: We have no objection and would stipulate that a photocopy may be substituted in lieu thereof.

THE COURT: All right, N will be admitted with leave to

25

person, or makes his life miserable, then we call it a neurosis or a person, as I mentioned before, might become depressed to the point that he's very unhappy or unable to function. That's a neurosis. Or a person may, instead of experiencing the anxiety, convert it into some sort of a physical symptom such as a paralysis of the arm, he can't move his arm. But, when you examine the nerves and the muscles and bones are all intact but it's something in the mind that prevents them from moving his arm.

That's a hysterical neurosis.

- And did you find Tom Creech to have these particular features at that time?
- A. We found -- well, the history was that in the courtroom he had a spell of difficulty in breathing if -- and once while he was at the hospital during the initial period of examination when he was placed in a room by himself against his will he had a period of difficulty in breathing.

This could either be something that was put on intentionally or it could be one of these hysterical symptoms which was unintentional, an expression of anxiety and I confess that I had no way of knowing which it was. But, I presumed it might be hysterical, that's why I gave him this diagnosis.

Q. All right, sir. And, Dr. Treleaven, at the time and during this period from April the 9th, 1974 to April the

2,930 BLADOW, E., Plf., Rbtl.Di. By Mr. Thomas.

1	Portland Police Department?
2	A. Yes. I was called to that location, to the
3	church, because a body had been discovered on the second floor
4	of the church.
5	Q. Were you in the Homicide Bureau of the Portland
6	Police Department?
7	A. I'm assigned to the Homidice detail.
8	Q What did you find when you arrived at the church?
9	A. We found a body of a male subject lying on a bed
10	located in the sexton's quarters on the second floor of the
11	church.
12	Q. And did you at any time subsequent thereto,
13	identify the person whose body was there in the church?
14	A. The person was later identified to be a
15	William Joseph Dean and he was identified by fingerprints.
16	Q. I will just ask you, Mr. Bladow, to tell us your
17	rank in the Police Department.
18	A. I'm a Detective with the Portland Police Department,
19	assigned to the Homicide detail.
20	MR. THOMAS: I have no further questions.
21	MR. ROBINSON: I have no questions at all, Your Honor.
22	THE COURT: All right. You may step down.
23	MR. ROBINSON: That witness may be excused as far as
24	we're concerned.
25	MR. THOMAS: Thank you.

1 THE COURT: All right, you may leave if you wish to. 2 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 3 MR. REMAKLUS: Your Honor, we have two more witnesses 4 and we are advised that the aircraft is late into Spokane. 5 They should be on their way into Wallace now. We would, 6 therefore, ask for a recess until they arrive. 7 THE COURT: All right, we'll take a recess, ladies and 8 gentlemen. If you remember the admonition, don't discuss the 9 case and keep your minds open. 10 (Recess taken.) 11 THE COURT: Show the jurors are all present. 12 Call your next witness. 13 MR. REMAKLUS: I'd like to recall Dr. Treleaven, please, 14 Your Honor. 15 16 JOSEPH HERBERT TRELEAVEN, called as a witness on behalf of the State on further rebuttal 17 18 examination, having been previously duly sworn, took the stand and testified further as follows: 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,932 COLLOQUY.

2,934 TRELEAVEN, J., Plf., Rbtl. Rex. By Mr. Robinson.

1 THE COURT: Before we start that, there's -- see if the 2 State has any redirect on the cross of this witness. 3 MR. REMAKLUS: No, Your Honor, we have no more redirect. 4 THE COURT: You are finished with the witness as far as 5 you are concerned? 6 MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: We are now proceeding with the witness now 8 as your own witness, Mr. Robinson, on your surrebuttal out of 9 order? 10 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: You understand, ladies and gentlemen, once 12 the State finishes with its rebuttal evidence, which we've 13 been hearing, then the defendant has a right to put on what we 14 call surrebuttal in response to any evidence -- any evidence in 15 the State's rebuttal. We're doing this a little out of order as we did 16 once before rather than make the Doctor come back on the 17 defendant's surrebuttal, we're just going to let him go into 18 that testimony right now as the defendant's own witness on 19 surrebuttal. 20 Go ahead, Mr. Robinson. 21 22 23 24 25

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,938 TRELEAVEN, J., Plf., Rbtl. COLLOQUY.

1 JOSEPH HERBERT TRELEAVEN, 2 called as a witness on behalf of the defendant for surrebuttal examination, having been previously duly sworn, took the stand 3 4 and testified as follows: 5 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. ROBINSON: 8 Dr. Treleaven, I previously started to ask you 9 some questions regarding Tomisene Creech. I believe you had 10 testified that she was at the Oregon -- and is it the Oregon 11 State Hospital? That's correct. 12 In Salem; is that correct, sir? 0. 13 That's correct. 14 15 In my discussion with you during that recess, Doctor, did you not advise me that under Oregon law the 16 privilege between doctor and patient would prevent you from 17 going into any detail regarding Tomisene Creech and her care, 18 doctoring and such? 19 Yes. It is my responsibility to keep information 20 about our patients confidential; whether it's proper for the 21 Court to overrule me or not, I don't know. But, I have to 22 assert that responsibility. 23 All right; and Doctor, were I to propound question 24 after question to you, would you find it necessary to insert that 25

2,939

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive

Boise, Idaho 83705

TRELEAVEN, J., Def.,

Srbtl. Di. By Mr. Robinson.

1 privilege on behalf of yourself and Tomisene Creech? 2 Well, the privilege is on behalf of Tomisene Creech. 3 It's not my privilege, it's my duty to honor that privilege. 4 All right. Now, was Tomisene Creech brought to the 5 Oregon State Hospital in a body cast suffering from physical 6 injuries? MR. REMAKLUS: Object on the ground that it's not 8 probative of any of the issues of this case, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Overruled. THE WITNESS: Since I already stated that, I will answer 10 11 yes. BY MR. ROBINSON: All right. And can you tell me 12 O. when it was that she was brought to the Oregon State Hospital? 13 14 I can only tell you what I did before. I think it was in May sometime, but I don't have her records and I'm not 15 at all sure of -- if that's accurate. 16 Do you recall the date of her injuries? 17 No, I do not. A. 18 And is she presently a mentally competent person? 19 MR. REMAKLUS: I would object on the grounds that it's 20 irrelevant and immaterial. 21 THE COURT: I don't see any relevancy unless -- unless 22 this is just preliminary to something else, Mr. Robinson. 23 MR. ROBINSON: Only preliminary, yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. The objection is overruled. 25

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,940 TRELEAVEN, J., Def., Srbtl. Di. By Mr. Robinson. THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I feel it's my responsibility, because of the privilege of the patient not to discuss her condition --

THE COURT: Well, Doctor, let me read to you what the privilege is in Idaho between a physician and a patient and I appreciate our Idaho law may not be the same as Oregon and probably isn't. But, the statute in Idaho on the patient-doctor privilege reads as follows:

"A physician or surgeon cannot, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in the attending of the patient which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient."

By that, and it has certain exceptions, exception in the case of physical injury to children, exception in the case of death of a patient, exception in the case of an action by higher or representatives to recover for personal action.

Now, our Supreme Court has interpreted this literally in accordance with the language of the Statute that the privilege doesn't extend to criminal cases. So, as far as Idaho law, I'd have to rule your privilege doesn't cover your patient in this particular action; being a criminal action and not a civil action.

THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, I'm certainly not an attorney and I really can't quote what the Oregon law is, but I would be willing to answer questions if you so order me.

25

0.

Have you been a consulting physician and psychiatrist

2,944 TRELEAVEN, J., Def., Srbtl. Di. By Mr. Robinson.

1	Circumstances surrounding it I don't know.
2	MR. ROBINSON: I have no further questions of the
3	Doctor.
4	As far as I'm concerned, Your Honor, he can be
5	released.
6	MR. REMAKLUS: I have no cross-examination.
7	THE COURT: All right. You may step down and you may
8	leave if you wish.
9	We do have those original exhibits.
10	THE WITNESS: Has the copy been marked with this
11	THE COURT: We've got it.
12	The record will show that we're releasing
. 13	Exhibit N to Dr. Treleaven and keeping a copy.
14	Do you want to look at this copy, Mr. Robinson, to
15	make sure?
16	MR. ROBINSON: I'm sure they are, Your Honor.
17	THE WITNESS: Yes, they appear to be in order.
18	THE COURT: Very well.
19	THE WITNESS: Thank you for your consideration.
20	THE COURT: Call your next witness.
21	MR. REMAKLUS: Jack Freeman.
22	
23	
24	
25	

1 JACK FREEMAN. 2 called as a witness on rebuttal examination by the State, having 3 been previously duly sworn, took the stand and testified as 4 follows: 5 6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 7 BY MR. REMAKLUS: 8 You are still under oath, Mr. Freeman. 9 State your name for the record, please. 10 A. Jack Freeman. 11 0. Are you the Elmore County Sheriff's Detective that's 12 testified heretofore in this case? 13 Yes, sir. A. 14 Mr. Freeman, directing your attention to the date 15 that the defendant and Carol Spaulding were placed under arrest 16 in Glenns Ferry, can you tell us what date that was? 17 Yes, sir. I believe that was November the 8th, 1974 18 And did you at any time ever -- you saw the 19 defendant at Glenns Ferry at that time as you previously 20 testified? 21 Yes, sir. And could you give us any idea of the amount of time 22 23 that you spent in the defendant's presence on the 8th day of 24 November, 1974; either -- both at Glenns Ferry, Idaho and at 25 Mountain Home, Idaho?

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,946 FREEMAN, J., Plf., Rbtl.Di. By Mr. Remaklus.

T	
1	A. Yes, sir. It would I would have to say around two
2	hours, or possibly a little more total time.
3	Q. And was this the first time you had ever seen the
4	defendant Tom Creech?
5	A. Yes, sir.
6	Q. And this arrest, or custodial situation, was only as
7	a result of the incident that happened in Valley County, Idaho;
. 8	was it not?
9	A. Yes, sir.
10	Q. During the time that you spent in the presence of
11	this defendant, did you ever say to him that if he confessed to
12	these two killings that you would let Carol Spaulding go?
13	A. No, sir.
14	Q. Ever have any conversation of that nature at all with
15	him?
16	A. No, sir. The conversation that I had with him was
17	real restricted.
18	Q. And you have heretofore testified as to them; have
19	you not, Mr. Freeman?
20	A. Yes, sir.
21	MR. REMAKLUS: I have no further questions.
22	MR. ROBINSON: I have no questions.
23	THE COURT: You may step down.
24	MR. THOMAS: Call Mr. Mason.
25	THE COURT: You are still under oath, Mr. Mason.
HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705	2,947 FREEMAN, J., Plf., Rbtl.Di. By Mr. Remaklus.

2,948 MASON, A., Plf., Rbtl.Di. By Mr. Thomas.

Г		
-	1	MR. THOMAS: No further questions, Your Honor.
	2	
Γ	3	CROSS EXAMINATION
_	4	BY MR. ROBINSON:
	5	Q. Mr. Mason, is that street price?
	6	A. That's street price, yes.
	7	Q And that is heroin that has only been cut 20 per cent?
Ī	8	A. Yes.
-	9	MR. ROBINSON: I have no further questions.
	10	THE COURT: Any redirect?
-	11	MR. THOMAS: Yes.
	12	
	13	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
	14	BY MR. THOMAS:
Γ	15	Q Mr. Mason, what do you mean by the term "street
	16	price"? Would you explain that to the jury, please.
	17	A. The wholesale price as the heroin enters the
г	18	United States would be a wholesale price and this is your pure
	19	heroin. Of course, it's then cut to be distributed on the street
Γ	20	and it's cut with lactose and other agents. So, the street
	21	price of heroin, we're talking about the addict for taking one
	22	pound of heroin and breaking it down into grams it would be worth
	23	probably between \$150,000 to \$200,000.
	24	Q. What is a "kilo" of heroin?
Π	25	A. Kilo of heroin is 2.2 pounds.
	IN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 1940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705	2,949 MASON, A., Plf., Rbtl. X. By Mr. Robinson. ReDi By Mr. Thomas

ReDi. By Mr. Thomas.

Γ.		
_	1	MR. THOMAS: That's all I have, Your Honor.
	2	
Г	3	RECROSS EXAMINATION
	4	BY MR. ROBINSON:
	5	Q. Mr. Mason, if heroin is cut to the dangerous point of
	6	5 per cent, what is the street price of a pound?
	7	A. About \$200,000. Most generally it's cut to about
_	8	6 per cent for injection.
	9	0. And the wholesale price?
-	10	A. About not over \$100,000.
	11	Q. That is to the true owners?
	12	a To the true what?
	13	O That's the value to the true owners?
	14	A. Yes.
	15	MR. ROBINSON: I have no further questions.
	16	MR. THOMAS: No redirect, Your Honor.
	17	THE COURT: You may step down.
	18	MR. REMAKLUS: Call Mr. Woodall.
	19	THE COURT: You are still under oath.
	20	MR. WOODALL: Yes, sir.
	21	
	22	WESLIE WOODALL,
	23	called as a witness for rebuttal examination by the State,
	24	having been previously duly sworn, took the stand and
	25	testified as follows:

1	DIRECT EXAMINATION
2	BY MR. REMAKLUS:
3	Q. State your name again, please, for the record.
4	A. Weslie Woodall.
5	Q. Mr. Woodall, you've already testified you are an
6	Investigator for the State. In your duties as State
7	Investigator, do you travel in Idaho extensively?
8	A. Yes, I do.
9	Q Would you travel the north-south highway between
10	Lewiston and Donnelly extensively?
11	A. Yes, I do.
12	Q. Now, by that, I mean from Lewiston to New Meadows
13	on U.S. Highway 95 and then from New Meadows on through McCall
14	and Cascade on Highway State Highway 55. Are you familiar
15	with that route?
16	A. I have traveled it many times.
17	Q. Do you know how far it is from Lewiston to Donnelly,
18	Idaho by that route, Mr. Woodall?
19	A. Yes.
20	Q. How far is that?
21	A. If you go from Lewiston on Highway 95 to Grangeville
22	from Grangeville to New Meadows, New Meadows to McCall, McCall
23	to Donnelly would be approximately 180 miles.
24	Q. And is there another well, no, this is the route
25	that we're interested in.

2,951 WOODALL, W., Plf., Rbtl.Di By Mr. Remaklus.

	Now, you are familiar with the road and the characteristics of the road; are you not, on that route that you have described? A. Yes, I am.
	Q. Could you give us an estimate of driving time from
	Lewiston to Donnelly, Idaho if you are going to drive straight
ě	through?
	A. Driving the speed limit and at approximately 55 miles
	an hour, it would take a good four hours.
1	Q. And would you describe the characteristics of the
1	route and the road from Lewiston on to Donnelly?
1	A. The road would be described as mountainous, a lot of
1	curves, a lot of turns and generally most of the road would
1	be considered a narrow highway.
1	Q. Mr. Woodall, do you know whether or not, prior to
1	November 3rd, 1974, that Whitebird Hill you still had to go
1	over the switchbacks?
1	A. Yes, you did. It was not done until 1975.
1	Q. And the new road was not open?
2	A. Right.
2	Ω So, it was slow road still there?
2	2 A. Yes.
2	MR. REMAKLUS: I have no further questions.
2	MR. ROBINSON: No questions, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: You may step down.

1 MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, at this point we have the 2 tendered document that the Court has discussed previously which 3 we are offering at this time. 4 THE COURT: Well, we will take that up after the noon 5 recess. We will take our noon recess until -- how much more 6 rebuttal do vou have? 7 MR. THOMAS: None. 8 MR. REMAKLUS: I think we're completed. 9 THE COURT: You think this is all you have? 10 MR. REMAKLUS: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Do you have some surrebuttal, additional 12 surrebuttal, other than what you've taken out of order? 13 MR. ROBINSON: Only the motion, Your Honor, for admission 14 of documents. 15 THE COURT: Is that all you'll have? 16 MR. ROBINSON: That's all. 17 THE COURT: We're going to give you a longer than usual 18 recess at noon today because of the state of the case right now, 19 ladies and gentlemen. So, I think before we release you for 20 your noon recess I want to just take a short recess and talk to 21 Counsel about our further proceedings in the case and, then, we 22 will tell you how long you'll have for a noon recess. 23 So, if you will abide by the admonition, don't 24 discuss the case and keep your minds open. 25 (Jury left the courtroom.)

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705

THE COURT: It seems to me most of these matters could be taken up out of the presence of the jury and, then, just simply presented, the results presented to the jury as an accomplished fact; whatever we decide on those matters and I'm wondering if then Counsel are anticipating that we can then go right into instructions after we've reviewed those and also review those during the noon recess for the jury, at least.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I'm sure we can.

THE COURT: Let's have Counsel come back earlier than usual and take up some of these matters.

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, that's satisfactory.

THE COURT: We could then settle the instructions and I suppose Counsel have any reason why we can't go right ahead and instruct the jury and, then, have closing arguments, at least start closing arguments, we might --

MR. ROBINSON: No reason that we have, Your Honor.

As a matter of fact we would prefer it if we could carry it through until completion.

THE COURT: Well, if Counsel -- I don't want to cut your lunch too short, but if Counsel could come back, say, at 1:00 will that give you enough time, 1:15, maybe.

MR. ROBINSON: 1:15, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, then, we'll have the jury come back at 2:00.

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT: See if we can't get these other matters taken care of before 2:00. MR. ROBINSON: All right, sir. THE COURT: Bring the jury back. (Whereupon the jury re-entered the courtroom and were released for lunch until 2:00.) 

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705

2,956 COLLOQUY.

rebuttal testimony by the State out of order. I think the record reflects that at the time the defendant has no further witnesses to present on Friday the State was then permitted to put on some evidence out of order in rebuttal.

I think they called Mr. Hilby and at the same time they offered what we've now marked as 49-A; which was the excerpt from 49. I think the record reflects that at that time Counsel entered into a stipulation, at least Mr. Thomas presented a stipulation with regard to the submission of what we have now marked as Exhibit 49-A. I had -- because of the uncertainty, I had the Court Reporter type up the exchange that took place at that time. I asked "Do you have any further rebuttal you want to put on out of order?"

Mr. Thomas stated at that time "Not at this time, Your Honor. I think that we have arrived at a stipulation with regard to the submission of a documentary exhibit; but we would not have any further witnesses at this time on rebuttal."

Then Mr. Robinson, "I'd just as soon do it now if the Court wants to take the time."

And I -- "The Court: It's all right with me."

"Mr. Thomas: We have no objection to doing that; it's just that the material that we wanted to extract from here and that we regarded be the subject of the stipulation, needs to be cut out of the rest of the document and we haven't got that done at this point."

1 "Mr. Thomas: Yes, Your Honor. 2 "Your Honor, rather than read it in, we'll simply 3 cut it out and submit it without reading it into the record if 4 that would be -- " 5 "The Court: So the jury will be able to identify 6 it later on in relation to the record and the Court's instructions; 7 as I understand, you are talking about Exhibit 49, is that 8 right?" 9 "Mr. Thomas: That's correct, Your Honor." 10 "The Court: Did you want to identify for the 11 record what the statement is?" 12 "Mr. Thomas: The statement relates to the interview 13 of E.C. Palmer with Thomas E. Creech dated 4-28-1975; a 14 typewritten transcript of the tape recorded conversation made 15 on that tape." 16 "The Court: All right. 17 "As to this particular Exhibit, ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to instruct you that first, this is still 18 19 part of the State's rebuttal; you understand they are putting on 20 out of order at this point, it isn't part of the defendant's 21 case. 22 "I'll instruct you that this statement is being 23 admitted for a limited purpose only. I will again remind you 24 of this limited purpose in my instructions, but at this time I 25 would advise you that this particular statement may not be

 considered by you as proof of the defendant's guilt; but may be considered by you only as it bears on the credibility of the defendant as a witness when he testified on the witness stand."

Now, my understanding from that exchange is that 49-A has, actually, been admitted at this time by stipulation as part of the State's rebuttal.

MR. ROBINSON: That's my understanding, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then, I think before the State had closed its rebuttal the defendant then moved to offer the entire Exhibit 49 and withdrew prior objections, is that right, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

THE COURT: And to try to keep the defendant's offer separate from the State's, we had 49 deemed marked Defendant's Exhibit M at this point as a defendant's Exhibit; although we didn't have a separate actual document to so mark.

Now, it seems to me at this point, on further reflection, that that was premature because 49-A was, really, admitted as part of the State's rebuttal and it wouldn't be appropriate to offer anything in surrebuttal until the State had closed its rebuttal.

So, I think perhaps at this point it would be, at least for you, to -- better for you to make a record at this point if the State is ready to close its rebuttal now that 49-A has been admitted clearly for the record.

THE COURT: As I understand the objection that was interposed that you refer to as "the same objection" when this same offer was made, perhaps prematurely, was irrelevancy?

MR. THOMAS: That is correct, and going only to those matters in the remainder of the Exhibit 49 which does -- or do not relate to the case on trial.

THE COURT: I think at that time I sustained that objection without comment. I've since reconsidered that and in the manner which it is now offered. I'm going to sustain the objection in part and overrule it in part.

I feel it would be appropriate to admit all other portions of Exhibit 49 which has also been deemed marked Defendant's Exhibit M that are consistent with prior testimony of the defendant to bear just as 49-A bears on his credibility and not for the truth of the matter, or to prove guilt or innocence.

Now, that's going to take some more editing. What the intent of my ruling is that all matters that relate to Mr. Creech's prior testimony that are consistent with that should be admitted.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, that's my understanding and our desire in the offer, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And any matters that are outside of his prior testimony and are not related to it, I would sustain as being irrelevant.

Now, there maybe are some points of dispute on that.

I'm wondering if, perhaps, Counsel themselves can agree on the majority of it and, if they have some areas of dispute perhaps let the Court resolve it; whether it's relevant or irrelevant.

MR. ROBINSON: Fine, Your Honor, I'm sure if we could have 15 or 20 minutes to go over it we could excise that material which we feel, together, is irrelevant.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. ROBINSON: And, then, submit it to the Court and see where we stand.

THE COURT: Very well. One other matter, then, we would take up at this time and, perhaps Counsel would want a recess to consider this matter.

The instructions. Now, I have copies here for Counsel to look at. Counsel want to come up and pick them up.

These instructions, in major part, were reviewed by Court and Counsel on Saturday. I will advise Counsel just for purposes of speeding up their review of these instructions that I have added the two instructions that Mr. Robinson had requested that I indicated I was going to add, put the one sentence -- add one sentence to the instruction on admissions and confessions and also the requested instruction on motive.

Now, I've also added three new ones that we didn't discuss.

I've added one on the female gender because we had

female witnesses; which is just a standard instruction that the 1 2 male refers to the female. 3 We discussed an instruction on other crimes. I've 4 formulated such an instruction and it is in that set now. 5 I've added one instruction on accomplice that just --6 I think a previous set of instructions on accomplice were 7 admitted in one of the standard instructions on accomplice but, unless an accomplice has quilty knowledge and intent, unless an 9 alleged accomplice has guilty knowledge and intent, he isn't an 10 accomplice; which is the instruction from the California set 11 and I've added that so that there are, basically, three -- or 12 two that we didn't discuss and, then, we did discuss the other 13 crimes instruction that I have formulated and put in. So, if Counsel want to go over these now for a few 14 15 minutes, why, then, we'll take a recess. MR. THOMAS: Yes, Your Honor. 16 MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you. 17 18 (Recess taken.) THE COURT: All right, Mr. Robinson, what's your 19 20 position now on Exhibit 49? MR. ROBINSON: Deemed marked as Defendant's Exhibit M, 21 Your Honor? 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. ROBINSON: We desire that the document in its entirety 24 25 be admitted into evidence without any deletions, interlineations

1 or extractions taken therefrom as far as that Exhibit is 2 concerned. 3 We already, of course, have settled 49-A? THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Remaklus? 4 5 MR. REMAKLUS: Well, since Exhibit 49 is going in its 6 entirety, it appears that the instruction concerning Exhibit 7 49-A would be a little bit misleading, Your Honor, because 49 8 contains 49-A. THE COURT: Well, I would say that if 49 goes in in its 9 entirety we would just send 49 to the jury and not 49-A. 10 11 MR. REMAKLUS: Then we would remove the instruction? THE COURT: The instruction would refer to 49, not 49-A. 12 MR. REMAKLUS: But the instruction will still apply to 13 the Exhibit? 14 THE COURT: 49, yes, but not 49-A. 15 MR. REMAKLUS: All right. 16 THE COURT: Well, all right, I'm going to -- if that's 17 your desire, Mr. Robinson, I'm going to admit the entire 18 Exhibit 49. 19 MR. ROBINSON: All right, sir. 20 THE COURT: And for the record, then, I don't see any 21 purpose in having it any longer referred to as Exhibit M because 22 I felt 49 had to be distinguished from your Exhibit because I 23 didn't think 49 was going in intact. I thought it would be 24 going in piecemeal and we'd still have to maintain 49 intact. 25

me to admonish the jury the same as I did with 49-A was admitted by stipulation but it's admitted for limited purposes. Since 49-A was admitted in their presence, it might be well to advise them that 49 will actually duplicate in part and, therefore, replace 49-A as an Exhibit.

All right. May the record show the proposed instructions have been furnished to you for examination, Mr. Remaklus, Mr. Thomas?

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, it may.

THE COURT: Do you have any objections you wish to state at this time for the record?

MR. THOMAS: Yes, we have just one. On the instruction related to premeditation. We believe that the instruction should include a phrase to the effect that premeditation may occur in such a short time as successive thoughts permitted. Beyond that we have no objection.

THE COURT: Do you have any requested instructions you feel have been omitted that you want put in?

MR. THOMAS: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. What's your position on that request that I amend the instruction on premeditation?

MR. ROBINSON: I feel that that is covered, Your Honor; that the wording of that instruction already clearly defines that to the jury by the wording that is there and I would object to any further attempt of explanation.

That means the State will have to reserve time out of their total two hours for rebuttal.

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if you want -- the State wants to divide the argument, the time will run against both of you; you understand that?

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, we understand that.

MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to allow Counsel, just for their reference and use, to keep these set of instructions they have. I hope the set I have here is the same as there. I think it is, all three of them. But, I would request -- ordinarily I don't do this, but the instructions are rather complicated and lengthy in this case so I would -- the reason I don't ordinarily do it, I have had the unhappy experience of having Counsel stand up and, as part of their argument, reread the complete instructions to the jury that were favorable to their side and I think that's improper emphasis of a particular instruction.

So, I'm not going to permit Counsel to do this, to just read verbatim entire instructions to the jury, but I will let you keep them just for purposes of making notes, or purposes of argument and reference to them as to what the law of the case is.

MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you.

MR. ROBINSON: May I inquire in that regard, Your Honor?

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

on the ones you have.

Since these are in our possession, is it all right if he could make marks and notes on the instructions ourselves?

THE COURT: Well, let's see. I don't want any marks on the set that goes to the jury. I ran off Xerox copies of those two sets. These have many typed instructions in -- all right, I'll let this set go to the jury and you can make marks

MR. ROBINSON: Thank you very much.

(Jury re-entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Show the jurors are all present.

The State may call their next witness.

MR. REMAKLUS: State rests, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any surrebuttal, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: On the surrebuttal, Your Honor, we move the admission of that which was formerly marked State's Exhibit No. 49 to be admitted in its entirety and, of course, that is, Your Honor, with the special instruction by the Court.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. REMAKLUS: No objection.

THE COURT: All right, I'll admit Exhibit 49 in its entirety.

I will advise you, ladies and gentlemen, that just for clarity we have previously admitted as referred to in your presence, of an Exhibit No. 49 of which only a part was admitted. This Exhibit now encompasses that other part that was admitted

gentlemen, it now becomes my duty as Judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case and it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you.

(Whereupon the Court instructed the jury as to the law of the case.)

THE COURT: Counsel may now present their arguments.

I think we'll take a ten-minute recess before we proceed with the argument.

Even though the evidence has been concluded, ladies and gentlemen, and you've heard the instructions of the Court, the case still isn't fully submitted until you've heard the closing arguments.

So, you should still abide by the admonition, don't discuss the case and keep your minds entirely open at this point.

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: Show the jurors are all present.

Mr. Thomas, you may proceed.

MR. THOMAS: Thank you, Your Honor.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury: The State has the opportunity to present the first of these closing arguments and I'd like to spend a few moments with you reviewing some of the evidence in the case.

I expect to be rather brief at this because I believe the important points can be highlighted rather quickly.

The evidence in this case shows that the defendant,
Thomas Eugene Creech, began planning his defense at an early
moment, right around the time that Officer Hill turned on the
red and blue lights of his police patrol vehicle, shortly after
that on the trip to Mountain Home during which time
Carol Spaulding and the defendant, Thomas Creech, were riding in
the back of the patrol car.

Miss Spaulding testified to you that the defendant told her, on the way up there, to invent a story about self-defense and, consistently with that, Carol Spaulding told Mountain Home -- an officer at Mountain Home, that the victims of this crime had held the knife at the throat of Thomas Creech.

At the same time Mr. Creech was telling officers at Mountain Home that one of the victims, Wayne Bradford, had made an attempt to rape Carol. And he also said that a knife had been involved and you'll find that in one of the exhibits that you'll be examining when you deliberate on the facts of that case, that's Exhibit No. 56; the defendant's voluntary statement which was taken at Mountain Home by Officer Weslie Woodall.

Later on Mr. Creech made the statement that this was a second degree murder case and that he would plead guilty to second degree murder because those people, namely Arnold and Bradford had really tried to rape Carol Spaulding. That information was on the statement that he made on the tape

recording which we played to you at an early part in the trial.

This, of course, is inconsistent with the idea of self-defense; which is suggested by the earlier statement that there had been a knife involved, or that some way or another Mr. Creech had been attacked by a knife and this theory was stuck to for quite awhile.

We submit to you that the most reliable statement from Mr. Creech was the one that he gave Bud Mason shortly after the plane crashed. Mr. Creech, in his testimony, doesn't remember this very well, according to him, but we have an Exhibit for you to examine in connection with that and that is a poem which Mr. Creech wrote talking about the plane crash. You'll find that among the materials you'll be examining as State's Exhibit No. 68.

We urge you to read this poem with some care because it shows a great deal of memory for the details of what happened right after the plane crash and Mr. Mason told you on the stand under oath that Creech had said to him at that time that this upsetting and shaking experience made a Christian out of him; that the jury had to convict him; that there was no reason to kill those men.

At that point we asked the Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there was only one trial pending at that time and the Court took judicial notice of the fact that the trial, which had been originally set to begin in

Cascade in May was pending against Mr. Creech at the time this statement was made. That statement is obviously referable to Arnold and Bradford because that was -- appears to be the only case that was pending against him at that time. That's a confession of murder in the first degree, taken with the other evidence.

There are a number of things that you've heard in the evidence of this case that suggest that Mr. Creech contrived to confuse the issues in this case, to lie his way out of the conviction for murder. In the first place, we mention the attempt to persuade Carol Spaulding, a moment ago, to tell the story about some self-defense while Creech and the -- Miss Spaulding were being transferred from Glenns Ferry to Mountain Home; which is exactly the same kind of thing that Gene Hilby testified that happened in Portland after William Joseph Dean was murdered by the defendant over there. After Hilby and Creech had left St. Mark's Episcopal Church in Portland, and driving away from there, Creech again suggested the idea, ought to make up a story involving self-defense in case Hilby and Creech were picked up. And things were brought into court to corroborate the fact that this murder had occurred in Portland. Detective Bladow, who gave you information about having found the body in St. Mark's Episcopal Church; furthermore, Mr. Creech admitted on the stand that he had made an effort to contact Miss Spaulding during the

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

course of this very trial and had asked her to subscribe to his theory that Dan and Carol Spaulding's sister, Kathy, had, in fact, committed the murder in order to deprive Arnold and Bradford of a pound of heroin; which was -- which was supposed to have been in the back of their car.

We have that admission and, in addition to that, among the exhibits you'll find the letter addressed from the defendant to Gene Hilby which was handed to Gene Hilby in this very courtroom; again claiming, in a way, with the fact that Hilby was here to testify.

It is no coincidence that the defendant, seeking to devise a new theory of self-defense sought to contact both of the eyewitnesses against him and, too, the inference to be drawn from that is that he attempted to support the theory

You also heard Sheriff Palmer testify as to a number of instances during the course of Mr. Creech's incarceration at the Ada County Jail where the defendant had faked illnesses, faked an attempt to escape from the jail.

that he's offering here in this trial was incorrect information.

All of these things cast considerable doubt on Mr. Creech's credibility as a witness in this trial as does the fact that he has the most to gain by lying to you in this case.

There are a number of items of evidence, however, which support and corroborate the information that the State has given you; which corroborates what we submit to be the only

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705

2,976 STATE'S CLOSING ARGUMENT.

accurate version given by the defendant of the facts, namely that version given to Bud Mason in the plane that there was no reason to kill Arnold and Bradford in the first place.

We presented the testimony of an eyewitness,

Carol Spaulding, who was there. Miss Spaulding said -
described the events, she did not describe any attack going on

against her. She described the man Arnold as having been

getting fresh with her, as having his arm around her shoulder

and, then, she said that as she got out of the car Creech pushed

her aside and reached in with Mr. Schreiber's pistol and shot

Arnold once in the temple and Bradford three times in the face.

That's premeditation. Mr. Creech had an opportunity to plan this in advance and it indicated that he thought in advance about committing these killings because he had time to push Carol Spaulding out of the way. He did so, that's an advance move, that's a premeditated plan indicating that he was about to kill these men.

Now, this Court's instructions that you heard a few moments ago about premeditation indicates that the amount of time in which one forms premeditation is not that significant. What counts is the intent in advance to kill someone. That's what we have in this case.

Mr. Creech doesn't have to be shown to have sat down for an hour in advance and devised a plan to kill Arnold and Bradford. This evidence, I submit, indicates that this was

a premeditated killing.

It was also a killing of malice aforethought because Creech intended to unlawfully kill these men. No other conclusion can be drawn from the facts that he pointed this .22 high standard pistol at both of them and pulled the trigger, in fact, killing them both.

You have the testimony, of course, that both victims died as a result of gunshot wounds. All of this evidence is corroborated by a number of other items of physical evidence.

In the first place, we have Mr. Schreiber's pistol, there isn't any doubt that this is the murder weapon.

Mr. Schreiber described to you how Thomas Creech was in his house with Carol Spaulding. He described to you how the gun was taken from there. He identified that as his gun when

Mr. Schreiber came back after being out for the day. The gun was gone and, so, when Mr. Creech and Miss Spaulding -
Spaulding testified that she was not the one that took it. It was obviously Mr. Creech who had it.

Carol Spaulding testified that Creech had the gun all the way down the road until after they left Boise, except for a brief period of time when they were in Boise and it was before that that the killing occurred.

It's clear that the gun was in Creech's possession at that time. It's clear that he had access to it right up

until the time that they were arrested. The gun was handed over to Miss Spaulding just a short time before the arrest, put it in her black handbag; which is over there on the evidence table and that's where it was when this defendant was arrested at Glenns Ferry.

The evidence is pretty clear that that was the murder weapon. You've heard the FBI Laboratory experts testify that cartridges, or shell casings found at the scene of the crime in the car were fired from this gun and that the riflings on the slugs which were removed by Dr. Scott during the autopsy were consistent with having been fired from that gun; even though it's impossible, in the condition that the bullets were in, to have had any further ballistics than that. But, it's pretty convincing as it is.

There's no question that was the murder weapon. In addition to that Mr. Creech's clothing was full of blood, at least the jacket he was wearing, both jackets found in possession in the automobile, both of which were identified to be Mr. Creech's, had a great deal of human blood on them, blood in many places.

Furthermore, both Creech and Carol Spaulding were seen during the day of the murder at various points along the road from Lewiston on down to Donnelly where the killing occurred.

Now, I want to point something out to you in connection with the testimony of John Stewart. You will recall that Mr. Creech was asked to stand up in the courtroom to

discredit Mr. Stewart's testimony.

Stewart described Creech as weighing something like 190 pounds and being taller than six feet. Keep in mind that this pea coat which has been introduced into evidence and identified by witnesses as belongint to the defendant is a bulky item. It is conceivable that anybody wearing this would appear to be more than 100 -- more than Mr. Creech appears to be when he stands up in the courtroom.

So, I would simply suggest to you, when you consider that, that Mr. Stewart's testimony is in any way discredited by the fact that Mr. Creech standing here without that coat on doesn't look like he weighs 190 pounds.

Furthermore, the statement that I mentioned to you a moment ago, State's Exhibit No. 56, taken at Mountain Home by Officer Woodall, shows that the defendant knew exactly how many slugs had been fired into the victims' bodies. Pretty clear information that he was there.

We have then the defendant's theory that it was actually Dan and Kathy who committed this murder while Mr. Creech was himself in another automobile and that the motive for this was to get a pound of heroin out of the back of the trunk -- or the car.

It seems quite incredible and I submit to you that it is, that these two drunks driving down the road in a 1956 automobile would have anywhere from one pound to \$200,000 worth

of heroin in the back of their car. That part of the story is simply unbelievable.

In addition to that I call your attention to the fact that none of the officers who testified and were cross-examined said anything about ever having heard this theory before the trial began. Furthermore the State brought before you information, testimony under oath, the persons who were accused of having committed the crime, Dan and Kathy Spaulding.

We demonstrated to you with the testimony of other witnesses that up until the time of this killing they were too far away to have been involved in it. I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this story is unbelievable and I refer back to the questions that we asked some of you during the voir dire about whether or not you could distinguish between a fanciful and imaginary doubt and a reasonable doubt. I submit to you that this is your opportunity.

This doubt which the defendant has attempted to interject with this story is an imaginary doubt. It is not credible in any way. The defendant has attempted in this case, by putting on evidence of a number of other crimes, and most of which you heard could not be verified, to confuse the issues in this case; just as the defendant has attempted to confuse law officers about what he has done and what he has not.

We submit to you that this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the defendant to draw attention away from the

fact that he committed the murders for which he's on trial here.
You are at liberty, ladies and gentlemen, to disbelieve this
unbelievable story.

I want to comment just a moment about the psychiatric evidence which you heard. All of the psychiatrists who testified here, testified that there was no significant evidence that the defendant was suffering from any mental disease or defect of a serious character. That is not to say, of course, that it is normal, necessarily, to go around killing people. But, the defendant has no excuse based on mental disease or defect in this case because he is not suffering from a mental disease or defect which causes the crime to be substantially the product of that.

All of the testimony as to the effect of this defendant could premeditate, could tell the difference from right and wrong, could conform his conduct to the law if he had wanted to do so. As the Court has instructed you, mere repeated antisocial conduct or criminal conduct is not itself sufficient mental disease or defect as to excuse the commission of criminal acts.

The evidence in this case shows that the defendant, Thomas E. Creech, shot Arnold and Bradford; that he had time to premeditate. It shows that he did premeditate; that he had malice aforethought because he intended to kill these people.

Ladies and gentlemn, I submit to you that the

accused, Thomas Eugene Creech, is guilty of murder in the first degree.

3

Does that close the State's closing argument? THE COURT:

4

MR. THOMAS: Yes, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Counsel may proceed.

6

MR. ROBINSON: Counsel, Judge Durtschi, ladies and

7

gentlemen of the jury:

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

first degree.

19 20

21

22

23

24

25

Unfortunately your work is just beginning. staff of this court, the officers of the court, the witnesses have completed their portion and your arduous task is just going to begin because you did not, and haven't been susceptible to all of the evidence in this case on a personal basis. You haven't heard it all. It has been submitted to you on the

admissions of particular items of evidence that the Court has weighed and determined were material and relevant for this jury to consider in performing its tasks and its deliberations on

this most serious of offenses in our society, murder in the

I'm sure that you are going to perform that duty that you swore to do on taking the oath as jurors. I submit to you that these items of evidence, being articles of clothing, are the same kind of evidence that you need consider that are here in writen form and those that have been admitted by the Court; which include the FBI reports, the FBI report that, specifically, tell you whether or not blood on Thomas Creech's coat was

matched, categorized and typed and where on the coat that blood did appear. That's something you must look closely at yourself in order to make a determination to the value of those articles and items of evidence.

No less than that the Court has admitted many other items, transcripts, for specific and limited purposes. The Court has admitted Defendant's Exhibits A and B, the rap sheets of Arnold and Bradford, the autopsy reports, Officer Hill's report and, specifically in that regard, Officer Hill's report goes into the terminology, the vulgarity, the profanity used by Carol Spaulding that we did not verbally bring to your attention and force the witnesses to embarrass themselves and embarrass you and embarrass us.

But that is in evidence for you to look at, to see, acquaint yourself with so that you can get the totality of the personalities involved in this most tragic circumstance.

In addition to that you have, in written form,
Dr. Hurst's report, Dr. LaMarr Heyrend's report and,
specifically, Dr. Treleaven's report. I submit to you that
all of the items that are covered in those written reports are
evidence in this case that you must examine and examine very
closely to make this determination.

The State in its opening portion of its statement made reference to this early planning of defense and I'm sure when you look at these written items of evidence that you will

Now, let's go back and relate specifically to what Tom Creech himself testified to you about his early youth, his family, the circumstances that he grew up under and this split home, the violence that was personally a part of his life and the impact that this had on the development of that personality from before age nine.

It has been calculated that the average age of this jury is 42 and a half years and for the consideration of this case that is most important because you, the jury, were not asked to come here and leave your experiences of life outside of the courtroom. You were to bring all of your exposure, your experience and your intelligence here and use it as members of this jury and, in using that I want to bring something to your attention you might have let slip.

If you will think back in the middle 50's

Thomas Eugene Creech born September 9, 1950, this world was
being subjected to extinction; as a matter of fact the latter
part of the 50's, the threat of annihilation by tremendous
explosives had an impact around the world that people were even
building bomb shelters in their back yards and in their

1

2

3

4

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1 basements.

This, on a daily basis, was coming across that media known as a television tube and, certainly, all of this had to have impact on the youth of America.

In addition to that impact Tom Creech's life was suffering under the impact of that home life described. These formative years being susceptible to this kind of a world and a society.

Think too of the early 60's where we, described by youth, the establishment, the riots, the disruption, the thoughts that you and I have lived through and the impact upon individual young people growing of age and attempting to maintain a semblance of order in life discipline, allegiance. Tom testified to you about his baptism, his double baptism and the manner and the way in which it was done, the split of religion. He explained to you this portion of his life and, then, the impact of an occurrence that took place when he was 15 years of age, and all of us here can remember what 15 years of age and growing up through adolescence was like with us.

The impact of Sandy's death and Danny Johnson's, the homosexual in San Francisco and during this period of time becoming susceptible to a Satanic Cult; to people who pulled Tom next to them, made him feel a part of and a follower.

He told you in his testimony that he made a pact with Satan and from that point on I'm sure I don't have to stand

here and reiterate all of the circumstances that were testified about; a death syndrome that followed over the next nine years.

During this period of time there was incarceration in the Idaho -- in the Ohio State Penitentiary or the reformatory, there were the impacts of his father's death, the then move to the Lima State Hospital, the subsequent discharge and that after a very erratic military career and that, interposed and following a marriage to Emma, and the AWOL's that was testified in great detail.

You put that all together with what you heard from the psychologists and the psychiatrists and what they testified to you, varying in their professional opinions, and you add it up to try to make a determination of that testimony and life as it relates and is consistent, or inconsistent, with the other evidence you now have to make yourselves acquainted with and bring that all to bear on what you are here to be the jury and make a determination of the facts that occurred in the early a.m. hours of November 4, 1974.

I submit to you, after your careful deliberation and your thoughts that there will be great disagreement among you all, but, that finally you will bring in a verdict and that verdict, we feel, will be the justice that should come in this case based upon these facts.

THE COURT: Mr. Remaklus.

MR. REMAKLUS: Your Honor, Mr. Robinson, ladies and

gentlemen of the jury:

We have been here a long time and I shall not keep you much longer. This attempt to put society on trial leaves me cold because, when you draw upon your experiences in life, how many young people do you know that use the excuse of an unhappy childhood to commit murder?

He is asking you people to excuse murder because he had an unhappy childhood. There's no way that you can tie this unhappy childhood into any kind of a mental condition that will excuse this man for what he did.

You heard Dr. -- you heard Dr. Estess, you heard Dr. Treleaven. They told you that he knew the difference between right and wrong. He knew the consequences of his acts. They didn't -- Dr. Heyrend never disputed that he didn't find mental disease or defect, ladies and gentlemen. Of course, neither did the psychologist.

I think his testimony was that everything was within the normal range. Just think of that. Think of this proceeding here we are in Wallace, Idaho in a courtroom. Contrast this, if you will, with the early morning hours of November the 4th, 1974 when Tom Creech was self-appointed judge, jury and executioner. Contrast that with this proceeding. A jury of 12 people of Shoshone County, this Court, able Defense Counsel, the reasonable doubt burden that we must bear as representatives of the State and which I am sure that we have met.

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 0940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,988 STATE'S FINAL ARGUMENT.

Ladies and gentlemen, there's a great mass of physical evidence. When you go to the jury room, of course, if you want to, you may open the bags that we have not opened. You will have coats, you will have the coat -- here's the long maxi coat that you will take in there to look at. This coat was, really, the key to this case. What if Lester Kelly had not been up around Lewiston, Idaho on November 3rd and just by chance driving along the road, saw young people that he thought were college kids when this old blue and white Buick pulled over to the side of the road. What did he see? The most striking thing was a young girl with long blonde hair and a long maxi coat and a young man, of course, that was with her wearing what we thought was a Navy pea coat.

Not a bad recollection, you know, for describing, driving by seeing it. I guess we wouldn't be here, ladies and gentlemen, if a young sharp-eyed police officer down in Glenns Ferry hadn't seen the same blonde girl with long hair wearing the same coat.

Anyway, at the opening of the trial my opening statement I talked about a road map of sorts and, of course, the map started at Lewiston, Idaho and we finally got down to Donnelly, Idaho. We had some detours, we had some detours into the trials of society, detours into some kind of a religion that I don't understand and that had no impact, I might add.

Then the statements of the Oregon Hospital that

were put in evidence this morning. I want to have you look at those very carefully; you are not going to find any Satanism in there, of course, where Satanism comes from, I don't know, but it came in, I think, since he was in the — oh, that came into the story since he was in the Oregon Hospital and they released him as a responsible human being.

But, anyway, we get down the road. We go down the road to this incredible story of these two men whose FBI sheets show that they were drunks and one of them, I think, was a child beater. But, these two men, one who had this old car, a battery charger was stolen and sold for gas money and beer money, somebody sold the coat for more money.

We're told that they had a couple hundred thousand dollars worth of heroin which makes you wonder why they sold the battery charger and selling the coat. But, we got to this place on State Highway 55, we have the Exhibit here.

When they arrived there you heard the evidence,

Carol, one was in the front seat, she wanted to trade places

with the defendant because, apparently Tom Arnold was getting

somewhat fresh, he had his arm around her shoulder and feeling

her breasts or something of that nature.

So, that was the reason that she asked to stop the car. Now, keep this in mind, ladies and gentlemen. She was sitting in the middle, the defendant gets out of the car, Carol got out of the car, was pushed aside, the defendant, with

Bill Schreiber's pistol, leaned back into the car, shot

Tom Arnold in the right temple -- in the right temple, okay, he's
behind the driver's wheel, he's got to be looking right straight
ahead down the road and he's shot in the temple. Bradford comes
out of the back seat and when he raises up he gets shot directly
in the face because he was facing Mr. Creech.

I wonder how dangerous Arnold and Bradford would have been as adversaries with Arnold -- the blood alcohol of .195 and Bradford with an alcohol of .14? Not very dangerous, ladies and gentlemen.

Can you imagine the scene there that night then as the evidence shows it was cold, it was windy, a young terrified girl and man with a pistol in his hand just murdered two men.

Just imagine that.

That old stinking car that they've testified to.

It's a little bit beyond belief. That's what happened, ladies and gentlemen, and that's what we have to deal with here today.

Anyway, the journey continues on down the road through an armed robbery down there in Boise, down to where the arrests were made because of Bill Hill's alertness there at Glenns Ferry. He sees the blondegirl in the maxi coat. Of course, that alerted him, the arrest was made and we finally get to the -- after the defendants were taken -- or after this defendant was taken to the Police Station in Glenns Ferry; that a notification of rights, a notification of rights for the

protection of this defendant, I think he signed that "Tom Turner" very carefully initialed it; all to show that he understood it.

This is a protection that this defendant received at Glenns Ferry before any statements were taken.

Shortly after that they were transferred up to Mountain Home and, again, the written notification of rights, carefully initialed, the full protection of the Constitution afforded to this man who didn't afford Arnold and Bradford a second look up there on the highway and, then, a statement, Exhibit 56. Now, this is a confession, ladies and gentlemen, please don't be misled because the voluntary statement here didn't say anything, you have to read what it says down here, here's the thing. Mr. Woodall took this statement and, again, he read the printed part with the constitutional warnings for the protection of this defendant. What did he say? Said "I did it". He said it three times and it's here for you to look at. Now, that's not in his handwriting, ladies and gentlemen. What is in his handwriting are the initials, the corrections every place that's crossed out, every page is signed by him and look down here at the bottom of Page 2, "I shot Tom first". Now, it says in there "Wayne" and that's crossed out and "Tom" is written over that and the initials "TEC". "I shot him one time" and over here initialed again to show that it was one time and the "S" is crossed out to show it's exactly right.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Then, he says "Wayne had a knife. Wayne had a knife and come after me." I wonder, if Wayne had a knife and came at him, when he was standing outside the car, that old car that the door where he was sitting is the only one that would open. "I hit him with the end of the gun he fell back and I shot him three times", again, very carefully initialed, "three times" and it certainly is no curious coincidence that Dr. Scott removed slug from Tom Arnold, who the defendant said he shot first and he removed three slugs from Bradford who the defendant said that he shot second and he shot him three times.

This statement goes on, you can take it in and you can read it. I'm sure you are as appalled as I am at the contents of the statements, that the story the defendant told here on the stand. It's unbelievable and when you draw upon your knowledge as mature men and women you are going to find that not believable too.

It was a pretty grim trip, ladies and gentlemen, from Lewiston to Donnelly, Idaho that night. I think we've got the trip and all its gorey details into evidence and that you will find no doubt in your mind as to what happened on that trip.

A detour or two about a biker, a biker without a bike, ladies and gentlemen. Do you know what the evidence is in this case about this man being a biker? He was seen pushing a Honda down the road one time down at Albuquerque and that's

the extent of the evidence, a biker. A hit man, a contract killer for money or for personal satisfaction.

insecure and he wants to be a big shot and the only way he's done it is through antisocial activity, breaking the law. This gets attention, gets him attention here in the courtroom.

The psychiatrists gave you the answers, he's

We're all here because of him. This is quite an event. He comes up here after this story and asks you people to excuse his acts and conduct. Incredible. Incredible.

Ladies and gentlemen, as you retire to read the statements, look at these pictures, look at the clothing, you play the tape recorder, the Judge is going to send the instructions with you so you can read them. You'll have, someplace in this great mass of evidence, you have the FBI report that will give you all of these "Q" numbers that we talk about so you can follow these things through the evidence and satisfy yourselves that the evidence that the State has presented here is.

In short, ladies and gentlemen, when we retire you to consider the verdict in this case you go through that door into the other room, when I sit down I know the administration of justice is secure in Shoshone County. I know that you people are going to review the evidence and return a verdict based only on the evidence that's produced in this courtroom as each of you stated you would do when we had jury selection which was a long

and arduous process and I know you all understand the reason for it.

I don't envy you your deliberations, I don't envy you the responsibility. But, everybody has responsibility in a case like this, the Judge to preside, the State to present their evidence and this jury to consider the evidence and return here a verdict based on the evidence that you saw in this courtroom and what you heard produced from that chair.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

THE COURT: Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of your number as foreman.

This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you arrive at a verdict, the foreman will sign it and you will return it to open court.

In arriving at your verdict you should not resort to any means or methods of chance.

Forms of verdict suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with these instructions.

At this point we're going to -- we don't have

Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster aren't here, they will have to be sworn

separately at a later time. But, I'm going to have the Clerk

swear the Bailiffs at this time to take charge of the jury during

their deliberations and we'll -- Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster come

up and we'll have them sworn separately.

(Whereupon Mrs. Dumont and Mr. Falsetto were sworn

to take charge of the jury.)

THE COURT: Well, ladies and gentlemen of the regular jury panel, now the case is fully submitted to you so you can now retire to deliberate together on your verdict.

Now, Mrs. Honeycutt, you've sat here and listened to the whole proceeding and you will still have to hold yourself available to be a substitute juror in case anything happens before the verdict is reached.

Our rules require that the substitute juror be kept in the custody of the -- it says "Sheriff" but the Bailiffs are Deputy Sheriffs, or in the custody of the Bailiffs during the trial until the jury is finally discharged in case you have to be used.

So, you will need to try to retain everything you've heard during the proceeding in case you need to utilize it sometime during the course of the deliberations and I will instruct the Bailiffs that Mrs. Honeycutt will have to be separate from -- she can't participate in the deliberations unless she is substituted as a regular trial juror. But, you will need to keep her available so -- and apply the oath as far as your supervision of her also as far as not communicating with anyone or having anyone communicate with her about the -- any subject connected with the case.

So, the regular jury may not retire and deliberate on your verdict.

(Whereupon the jury retired to the jury room.) 1 2 THE COURT: If you'd swear Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster, 3 please. 4 (Wereupon Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster, two of the 5 Bailiffs herein, were sworn to take charge of the jury.) 6 THE COURT: May the record show that in the trial record 7 there are no Exhibits marked 31 through 40, inclusive; that 8 those exhibits were marked at the beginning of the trial in 9 Cascade, in Valley County and in the present trial have been 10 incorporated in Exhibit 47 -- wait a minute, it's more than 47. 11 The shell casings in one of these --12 MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, 32 through 40 are "Q" numbers in 13 this trial. 14 32 through 40 are included in Trial Exhibit THE COURT: 15 472 16 MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And 31 is what? That's 46? Exhibit 31 is 18 in one of those Exhibits, then? MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor, Exhibit 31 is either 19 here included in Exhibits 46 or 48, as I understand it. 20 THE COURT: Yes. All right, I guess that's --21 MR. REMAKLUS: We have some other Exhibits that were 22 23 marked at Cascade and not used in this trial. 24 THE COURT: Can you put those in the record just for 25 continuity?

1 all right? 2 THE COURT: Yes. 3 (Off the record discussion between Court and 4 Counsel had.) 5 THE COURT: We will take Mrs. Dumont first and we will 6 just ask you -- if you have additional information she doesn't 7 have, you can give it to us, Mr. Falsetto. 8 Why don't you swear her. 9 10 JOICE DUMONT, 11 a Bailiff in the above-entitled case, being first duly sworn, 12 testified as follows: 13 14 THE COURT: Why don't you sit up here, Mrs. Dumont, and 15 we can hear you better. 16 I was thinking maybe, before we start this, we ought to let them get the Exhibits and instructions and verdicts 17 18 in there. Mr. Falsetto, do you want to start doing that and take these in first. These are the instructions and the verdicts 19 20 and, then, probably start taking those Exhibits in. Why don't we just relax until he gets those Exhibits 21 22 in and then we can start. 23 (Brief delay.) 24 25

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 2,999 COLLOQUY.

	1	EXAMINATION
	2	BY THE COURT:
-	3	Q. Would you just state your name for the record.
	4	a. Joice Dumont.
-	5	Q. And, Mrs. Dumont, you've been one of the Bailiffs
_	6	that has acted during this trial since it started, is that
	7	right?
~	8	A Yes, that's right.
	9	Q. Can you tell me, were you originally sworn in as a
1	10	Deputy Sheriff to act as Bailiff?
1	11	A. Yes, that's right.
1	12	Q. And that was before this trial ever started?
_ 1	13	A. Yes. I believe it was on a Thursday or so, of the
1	14	previous week.
_ 1	15	Q. And you, as I understand actually, all four of
1	16	you, you and Mr. Falsetto and Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster had
1	17	instructions from Judge Towles as to your duties as a Bailiff
_ 1	18	when you were first sworn in, is that right?
1	19	A. Yes. Your Honor, I never met with Judge Towles
2	20	because I was one that was called later.
2	21	Q. Later?
2	22	A. Yes. He was gone when they called me and I didn't
2	23	meet with him.
2	24	Q. You did have a meeting with me before the trial
2	25	started?

3,001

By The Court.

10940 Hollandale Drive

Boise, Idaho 83705

1	went out the back door and there was nothing said in any way.
2	Q That happened on two occasions?
3	A. Yes, one on a Monday and the other on a Saturday.
4	Q. As I understand, Mrs. Dumont, you have, all four of
5	you, have kept a running log of the entire custody you've had
6	of the jury during the trial; is that correct?
7	A. Yes, times we've left and any incidents or anything,
8	phone calls and such.
9	O. Are you personally acquainted with the arrangements
10	at the motel as far as what were in the rooms, TV, telephone and
11	things like that?
12	A. The only TV was in the, what they considered the
13	Community Room of Unit 45 and that was always monitored. There
14	was someone there.
15	Q Who occupied that room?
16	A. Mr. and Mrs. Armbruster.
17	Q. That was the Bailiffs' room?
18	A. Yes, um-hmm.
19	Q And that was the only room that had a TV?
20	A. Yes, to my knowledge.
21	Q In other words, the TVs were taken out of all the
22	juror's individual rooms?
23	A. I'm not sure about being taken out, but I think I
24	heard them mention that they were disconnected.
25	o I think, maybe, the Armbrusters, know more about that,

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 3,004 DUMONT, J., Bailiff, Exam. By The Court. reference to the room you were in?

A. Yes. The rooms were on the -- on the west side and court in between and rooms run from 35 to 41, inclusive, and 11 to -- I can't remember the numbers of those rooms, anyway. But, they were all facing -- we were facing the rooms from our room where we stayed and we had a window that we could observe all these rooms and this room was on the far corner and they called it the "Executive Room", I think. Usually it was around 5:00 when we'd get there and that was about the time the jury would come and we'd take them to dinner around 6:30. We'd leave the day Bailiffs at that time.

Of course, then the jurors, they'd come over to our place and we'd have coffee or whatever they wanted and they'd set around in there; those that wished to, and rest stayed in their rooms.

- Q. You were located, then, so you could observe the doors to all the rooms of the jurors?
  - A. At all times we could see those all the times, yes.
- Q Did one or the other, you and Mrs. Armbruster, stay awake all night to watch?
- A. We'd usually when the other would retire, I would lie down for about an hour and a half and she'd wake me and, then, I'd take over until morning.
- Q. I see. Can you describe to us what was done in the individual rooms of the jurors as far as TV and telephones?

there was one for every room, but they were all delivered to our room and, before anybody saw them they were censored and anything that was in there relating to the trial was clipped out and every morning, one or the other of us would get a Spokesman Review and we censored that before anybody saw it.

Usually the paper was always left in our room because there was only one paper and anybody that wanted to see it, they'd read it there.

- Q Okay. I understand from the testimony of Mrs. Dumont and Mr. Falsetto yesterday that you kept a daily log of the activities of the jury, is that right?
- A. Well, that's true. My wife done that. She's a better bookeeper.
  - Q You might just ask her about that?

Let me just ask you if you are personally aware of any time during your custody of the jury which was, as I understand, from the beginning of the trial that all night recesses, that anyone was permitted to communicate with any of these jurors about any subject connected with the case?

A. Never. In our -- those jurors were never out of our vision at any time that they talked to anybody, anytime, any -- and that was only from relatives that might come to see them and one or the other was with them at all times. They were instructed ahead of time that they didn't dare talk about anything concerning the trial.

3,015

ARMBRUSTER, S., Bailiff

Exam. By The Court.

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R.

10940 Hollandale Drive

Boise, Idaho 8370S

community room for all of them.

25

1	THE COURT: Counsel want to examine?
2	MR. REMAKLUS: No, thank you.
3	MR. ROBINSON: Defense has nothing, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: I want to express my personal appreciation,
5	I know I speak for Counsel, for your fine service as a Bailiff
6	in this case. You may step down.
7	THE WITNESS: Thank you.
8	MR. REMAKLUS: May I be heard for just one moment,
9	Your Honor?
10	On behalf of Mr. Thomas and myself we'd like the
11	record to show our appreciation to the fine people of Shoshone
12	County for the hospitality that has been extended to us and
13	the fine service rendered by all law enforcement personnel and
14	the citizens of this community.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Robinson?
16	MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor, we want the record to
17	reflect that the Defense joins in that. Thank you.
18	THE COURT: The Court does to. I feel we've certainly
19	had fine service from all the public officials in this County.
20	Counsel, I think the jury has advised the Bailiffs
21	they do have a verdict. Are Counsel ready to proceed with
22	that matter now?
23	MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor.
24	MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: I want to make one observation just to the

the foreman under the instructions of the Court.

2

3

4

5

....

O

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

Count II.

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The way we handle this, ordinarily, we would just have the Clerk read the verdicts to the jury and, then, ask

the jurors if they agreed with the verdict and they could answer in unison.

Because of the nature of this case, I'm going to

require the Clerk to poll you individually on each verdict.

she'll call your individual names, go through you one at a time

What the Clerk will do will read the verdict in Count I, and then,

and, if you agree with the verdict say "Yes". If there's any

of you that had any question about the verdict, didn't understand

which one the foreman was going to sign or that he was going to

sign this one and -- in other words, if you don't agree with the

Then, we'll repeat the same process with

verdict say "No" when your name is called.

If you would read the verdict as to Count I, Madam Clerk, and then, poll the jury.

(Whereupon the verdict as to Count I was read by the Clerk and jury polled individually as to Count I.)

THE COURT: It appearing that the verdict was unanimous, I'll direct the Clerk to record the verdict.

Read Count II, Madam Clerk.

(Whereupon the verdict as to Count II was read by the Clerk and jury polled individually.)

THE COURT: It appears to the Court that the verdict is unanimous. I'll direct the Clerk to record the verdict as to Count II.

This completes your service in the case, ladies and gentlemen. I wish to express appreciation to you for your service in the case. It's been, I know, not a pleasant service for you. It's been unpleasant, it's been trying under the circumstances of being sequestered. But, we do appreciate your service in this case.

Our whole jury system depends upon the citizens performing this duty that you've performed and upon their integrity and I know of no service a citizen can perform that's a higher duty of citizenship than to serve on a jury and I do express appreciation to you, each one, for your service and also to the alternate juror for her service in this case.

You may be discharged at this time.

Before proceeding, I'm going to let the jurors leave (Jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Defendant is entitled, under statute, to take time before judgment is pronounced. Do you wish to take time before judgment is pronounced?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, we do, and, in that regard, I would at this time request the Court that any further proceedings be had in Boise, Idaho and appeal to the Court to cause an immediate transfer of Thomas Eugene Creech to the Ada County

1 Courthouse at Boise and we will stand ready, soon as possible, down there, Your Honor, to cover the balance of the matter. 2 3 MR. REMAKLUS: That's agreeable, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Is this agreeable to you, Mr. Creech? 5 MR. CREECH: Yes, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: You understand you would have the right to 7 have all further proceedings in this County; being the County 8 to which venue was changed; including the pronouncement of judgment and you are willing to waive the right; is that 9 10 correct? 11 MR. CREECH: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: All right, I'll enter an order to that effect if you'll prepare it, Mr. Robinson. 13 14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: I'll continue the matter for further 15 16 proceedings to -- let me ask you; do you have any specific request for a particular time? 17 MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, I do. I must remain here on 18 the Sunshine case throughout this week and I do have a 19 commitment in the Sunshine matter to go underground next 20 Wednesday, on the 27th and hear motions before Judge Towles on 21 the 30th. 22 I would request the Court to set this matter up a 23 week from next Monday. 24 25 THE COURT: You want November the 3rd, then, is that the date?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'll set further proceedings in the matter to be had on November 3rd in Ada County, Idaho, at 3:30 p.m.

We'll be in recess at this time. The defendant will be remanded into the custody of the Sheriff.

I think we have a problem on these exhibits. Do you have a proposal, Mr. Remaklus?

MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor, I would request that
Derold Lynskey, Sheriff of Valley County, Idaho, be appointed
custodian of all evidence in this case, with specific direction
to return the same in his custody to be held by him at the
Valley County Courthouse until final disposition of this case.

MR. ROBINSON: I have no objection.

THE COURT: All right, I'll enter such an order if you'll prepare it.

MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you.

THE COURT: I want to express appreciation of Counsel for their courtesy in the case. I felt you both treated the Court very well and appreciate it.

MR. ROBINSON: From the Defense, I felt that the Court in this instance aided and assisted Counsel and I certainly appreciate it personally.

MR. REMAKLUS: I'd like to, Your Honor, express our

-	
1	appreciation.
2	(Whereupon the trial was concluded.)
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 0940 Hollandale Drive	3,024 COLLOQUY

0940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705

1

# INSTRUCTION NO. 1:

4

3

5 Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:

6

7

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case, and it is your

8

duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you.

9

The function of the jury is to determine the issues

10

information filed in this court and the defendant's plea of

of fact that are presented by the allegations in the

11 12

"not quilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by

13

pity for a defendant or by passion or prejudice against him.

14

You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against a defendant

15

because of the fact that he has been arrested for this offense,

16

or because he has been brought before the Court to stand trial.

17

None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you are not

18

permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them

19 20 that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.

21

of the defendant you are to be governed solely by the evidence

Therefore, in determining the guilt or innocence

22 23 introduced in this trial and the law as stated to you by the

24

Court. For such purpose the law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,

25

public opinion or public feeling. Both the State and the

defendant have a right to demand, and they do demand and expect, that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. Such verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 2:

The masculine form as used in these instructions applies equally to a female person.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 3:

If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea be stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and are to regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 4:

I have not intended by anything I have said or done or by any questions that I may have asked to intimate or suggest what you should find to be the facts, or that I believe or disbelieve any witness who may have testified, and if anything that I have done or said has seemed to so indicate, you will disregard that intimation and form your own opinion without regard thereto.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 5:

You are the exclusive judge of the facts and of the effect and value of the evidence, but you must determine the facts from the evidence received here in court.

You must not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial; however, if counsel for the parties have stipulated to any fact, you will regard that fact as being conclusively proved.

As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection.

You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was rejected, nor any evidence that was stricken out by the Court; such matter is to be treated as though you

had never heard ic.

2

3

4

5

6

7

INSTRUCTION NO. 6:

the answer.

8 9

10

object, or anything presented to the senses offered to prove the existence or non-existence of a fact is either direct or

suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not

evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The testimony of a witness, a writing, a material circumstantial evidence.

You must never speculate to be true any insinuation

Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes that fact.

Circumstantial evidence means evidence that proves a fact from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn.

An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence.

It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be proved also by circumstantial evidence. There is no distinction between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence as a means of proof. Neither is

entitled to any greater weight than the other.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7:

Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.

At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

You are again instructed that you must not consider such evidence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 8:

Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses who have testified in this case.

In determining the credibility of a witness you may consider any matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony, including but not limited to the following:

 His demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies;

it to be entitled. You may disregard any such opinion if you find it to be unreasonable.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 10:

When a witness refuses to testify as to any matter, basing his refusal on the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, you are not to draw from that fact any inference as to the credibility of the witness or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 11:

Evidence that on some former occasion, a witness who is not a party to this action made a statement or statements that were inconsistent with his testimony in this trial, may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of testing the credibility of the witness. Testimony of such inconsistent statements must not be considered by you as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion.

testimony in other particulars.

2

1

3

5

\_

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

.....

16

17

18

19

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 13:

20

21

22

23

24

25

The fact that a witness has been convicted of a felony, if such be a fact, may be considered by you only for the purpose of determining the credibility of that witness. The fact of such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair the witness' credibility. It is one of the

A witness willfully false in one material part of

However, discrepancies in a witness' testimony or

his testimony is to be distruxted in others. You may reject

the whole testimony of a witness who willfully has testified

between his testimony and that of others, if there were any,

Failure of recollection is a common experience; and innocent

persons witnessing an incident or a transaction often will

see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains

to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should

be considered in weighing its significance.

misrecollection is not uncommon. It is a fact, also, that two

do not necessarily mean that the witness should be discredited.

you shall believe the probability of truth favors his

falsely as to a material point, unless, from all the evidence,

### INSTRUCTION NO. 14:

A statement made by a defendant other than at his trial may be either an admission or a confession.

An admission is a statement by a defendant, which by itself is not sufficient to warrant an inference of guilt, but which tends to prove guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence.

A confession is a statement by a defendant which discloses his intentional participation in the criminal act for which he is on trial and which discloses his guilt of that crime.

You are the exclusive judges as to whether an admission or a confession was made by the defendant and if the statement is true in whole or in part. If you should find that such statement is entirely untrue, you must reject it. If you find it is true in part, you may consider that part which you find to be true.

Evidence of an oral admission or an oral confession of the defendant ought to be viewed with caution.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 15:

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10<del>00</del>/0

9

10

11

12

13

# INSTRUCTION NO. 16:

defendant's quilt.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

No person may be convicted of a criminal offense unless there is some proof of each element of the crime independent of any confession or admission made by him outside of this trial.

In regard to the preceding instruction you are

reminded that Exhibit No. 49, as I told you at the time the

Exhibit was admitted, may be considered by you only for the

limited purpose of testing the credibility of the defendant

confession and must not be considered by you as evidence of

the truth of the facts as stated therein or as proof of the

trial. This Exhibit was not admitted as an admission or

as a witness when he testified on the witness stand during the

The identity of the person who is alleged to have committed a crime is not an element of the crime nor is the degree of the crime. Such identity or degree of the crime may be established by an admission or confession.

3,034 JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17:

A conviction may not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 18:

An accomplice is one who is liable to be prosecuted for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.

To be an accomplice, the person must have knowingly and with criminal intent aided, promoted, encouraged, or instigated by act or advice, or by act and advice, the commission of such offense.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 19:

Merely assenting to or aiding or assisting in the commission of a crime without guilty knowledge or intent is not criminal, and a person so assenting to, or aiding, or assisting in, the commission of a crime without guilty knowledge or intent in respect thereto, is not an accomplice in the commission of such crime.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 20:

2

3

4

5

6

Corroborative evidence is evidence of some act or fact related to the offense which, if believed, by itself and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant

with the commission of the offense charged.

7 8

9

10

However, it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged, or that it corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies.

12

13

14

11

In determining whether an accomplice has been corroborated, you must first assume the testimony of the accomplice has been removed from the case. You must then determine whether there is any remaining evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.

15 16

17

If there is not such independent evidence which tends to connect defendant with the commission of the offense,

19

18

the testimony of the accomplice is not corroborated.

20 21

believe, then the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated.

If there is such independent evidence which you

22

But before you may convict the defendant you must find from

23

all the evidence that it carries the convincing force

24

required by law.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 21:

2 3

4

5

6

7

It is the law that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case.

8 9

### INSTRUCTION NO. 22:

11

12

13

10

Evidence has been received tending to show that the defendant may have committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial.

14 15

Such evidence was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that he is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.

17

18

16

Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show:

19 20

> The mental state of the defendant at the time 7. of the alleged offense for which he is on trial and at the

21 22

time of his arrest for that offense.

2324

2. The identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the defendant is accused;

INSTRUCTION NO. 23:

 The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged.

4. That the defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary for the commission of the crime charged.

For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case.

You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.

Where the case of the State rests substantially or entirely on circumstantial evidence, you are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged against him unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion and each fact which is essential to complete a set of

circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's quilt has

Also, if the evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and the other to his innocence, it is your

been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant's innocence, and reject the other which points to his guilt. If, on the other hand, one interpretation of the evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, it would be your duty to accept the reasonable interpretation and to reject the unreasonable.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 24:

The defendant, Thomas Eugene Creech, is here upon trial on an Information filed in this Court by the Prosecuting Attorney of Valley County, Idaho, charging the defendant with the crime of Murder in the First Degree.

The charging part of said Information reads as follows:

County of Valley, State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, intentionally, feloniously and deliberately with premeditation and malice aforethought and the intent then and there had to kill and murder one Edward Thomas Arnold with a certain High Standard 22 Caliber Automatic pistol bearing Serial No. 366934, then and there held in his, the said defendant's hand, and then and

0940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 1 the 2 kno 3 and 4 mus 5 afc 6 tha 7 the 8 sai 9 Edu

there loaded, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly, intentionally, feloniously and of his own deliberate and premeditated malice aforethought with intent to kill and murder the said Edward Thomas Arnold, a human being, as aforesaid, aim, shoot, and discharge the said loaded pistol so that the said Edward Thomas Arnold was struck in the head by the bullet from the said pistol shot and discharged at him by said Thomas Eugene Creech, mortally wounding said Edward Thomas Arnold from which mortal wound he sickened and died at Valley County, Idaho, on the 4th day of November, 1974."

COUNT II: "That the said defendant, Thomas Eugene Creech, on or about the 4th day of November, 1974, at and in the County of Valley, State of Idaho, then and there being did then and there knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully, intentionally, feloniously and deliberately with premeditation and malice aforethought and the intent then and there had to kill and murder one John Wayne Bradford with a certain High Standard 22 Caliber Automatic pistol bearing Serial No. 366934, then and there held in his, the said defendant's hand, and then and there loaded, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly, intentionally, feloniously and of his own deliberate and premeditated malice aforethought with intent to kill and murder the said John Wayne Bradford, a human being, as aforesaid, aim, shoot and discharge the said loaded pistol

so that the said John Wayne Bradford was struck in the head by three bullets from the said pistol shot and discharged at him by said Thomas Eugene Creech, mortally wounding said John Wayne Bradford, from which mortal wound he sickened and died at Valley County, Idaho, on the 4th day of November, 1974."

"All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho."

The defendant has heretofore entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charges set forth in the Information.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 25:

Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must decide each count separately on the evidence and the law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. The defendant may be convicted or acquitted on any or all of the offenses charged. Your finding as to each count must be stated in a separate verdict.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 26:

A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 27:

Before you may convict the defendant of the crime charged against him by the Information, you should require the prosecution to prove every material allegation contained in the Information beyond a reasonable doubt; and if, after a consideration of all the evidence in the case, you entertain a reasonable doubt of the truth of any of these material

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R.

0940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705

allegations, then it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.

Probabilities, or that the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence supports the allegations of the Information, will not support a conviction.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 28:

If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged, he may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offense of Murder in the First Degree with which the defendant is charged necessarily includes the lesser offenses of Murder in the Second Degree and Voluntary Manslaughter.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 29:

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.

Such malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention

unlawfully to kill a human being. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. An abandoned and malignant heart is a condition of heart and mind having no regard for social and moral obligations. Malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life.

Malice aforethought does not necessarily imply a pre-existing hatred or enmity toward the person killed.

"Aforethought" does not imply deliberation or the lapse of considerable time. It only means that the required mental state must precede rather than follow the act.

INSTRUCTION NO. 30:

All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of wilful deliberate and premeditated killing with malice aforethought is murder of the first degree.

The word "deliberate" means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.

The word "premeditated" means thought over beforehand.

If you find that the killing was preceded and

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition, precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.

The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree. To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decide to and commit the unlawful act causing death.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 31:

Murder of the second degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 32:

Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being as the direct causal result of an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life.

When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 33:

Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought.

There is no malice aforethought if the killing

occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

2

3

### INSTRUCTION NO. 34:

4

5

6

7

The distinction between murder and manslaughter is that murder requires malice while manslaughter does not.

done in the heat of passion or is excited by a sudden guarrel

manslaughter. In such a case, even if an intent to kill exists,

such as amounts to adequate provocation, the offense is

the law is that malice, which is an essential element of

When the act causing the death, though unlawful, is

8

10

11

12

13

14

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 35:

murder, is absent.

15

16

17

18

19

20

To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of such character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse such passion, and the assailant must act under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

21

22

23

24

25

"Heat of passion", as the term is used in our law, means such passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition in the same or similar circumstances as those in question, and such

as would cause him to act rashly, without reflection and deliberation, and from passion rather than from judgment. Hence the defendant may not set up his own standard of conduct and be permitted to justify or excuse himself merely because his passions were aroused. To apply the proper standard by which to judge the conduct of the defendant, you will ask and answer whether or not the ordinarily reasonable person, if placed in the same position in which the defendant found himself and if knowing what the defendant then knew, would have been thrown into a heat of passion.

If there was provocation, but of a nature not calculated to naturally arouse passion, or if sufficient time lapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killing of a human being followed such provocation, and had all the elements of murder, as I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 36:

Neither the emotion of fear, of itself, nor the emotion for revenge, of itself, nor any or all of these emotional states, in and of themselves, constitute the heat of passion referred to in the law of manslaughter which I have

stated to you. Any or all of such specific emotions may be involved in a heat of passion that causes judgment to give way to impulse and rashness, but also any one or more of them may exist in the mind of a person who acts deliberately and from choice following his own reasoning howsoever good or bad it may be. Hence the law sets up the standard and requires the test that I previously have stated to you for determining whether or not the defendant acted under heat of passion.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 37:

To reduce a killing upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion from murder to manslaughter the killing must have occurred while the slayer was acting under the direct and immediate influence of such quarrel or heat of passion. Where the influence of the sudden qua-rel or heat of passion has ceased to obscure the mind of the accused and sufficient time has elapsed for angry passion to end and for reason to control his conduct, it will no longer reduce an intentional killing to manslaughter. The question as to whether the cooling period has elapsed and reason has returned is not measured by the standard of the accused, but the duration of the cooling period is the time it would take the average or ordinarily reasonable person to have cooled his heat of passion and for his reason to have returned.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 38:

U

# 

### 

To constitute murder or manslaughter there must be, in addition to the death of a human being, an unlawful act which was a proximate cause of that death.

The proximate cause of a death is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produced the death, and without which the death would not have occurred.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 39:

Notive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absen-e of motive may tend to establish innocence. You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 40:

Before you may return a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, but also, if you should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree unanimously as to

whether he is guilty of murder of the first degree or murder of the second degree or manslaughter.

## INSTRUCTION NO. 41:

If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or the second degree, you must give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 42:

When the evidence shows the existence of provocation that played a part in inducing the unlawful killing of a human being, but also shows that such provocation was not such as to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, and the jury finds that the killing was murder, they may consider the evidence of provocation for such bearing as it may have on the question whether the murder was of the first or second degree.

1 INSTRUCTION NO. 43:

If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 44:

Upon a trial of a charge of murder, it is a defense that the killing was justifiable and not unlawful.

If you have a reasonable doubt whether the killing was unlawful you must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 45:

Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by a person in the lawful defense of himself or any other person, when he has reasonable ground to apprehend that he or such other person is in danger of death or great bodily injury and that there is imminent danger of such a design being accomplished.

In order to justify the taking of human life in

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

self-defense, the slayer, as a reasonable man, must have reason to believe and must believe that he or such other person is in danger of death or of great bodily injury; and further, the circumstances must be such that an ordinarily reasonable person, under similar circumstances would believe that it was necessary for him to use in his or the other person's defense and to avoid death or great bodily injury to himself or such other person, such force or means as might cause the death of his adversary.

A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a homicide. To justify taking the life of another in self-defense, the circumstances must be such as to excite the fears of a reasonable man placed in a similar position, and the party killing must act under the influence of such fears alone. The danger must be apparent and must be present and imminent, or must so appear at the time to the slayer as a reasonable man, and the killing must be done under a well-founded belief that it is necessary to save one's self or another person from death or great bodily harm.

20

21

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 46:

22

23

24

25

The defendant in this case has introduced evidence tending to show that he was not present at the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense for which he is here

on trial. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time the crime was committed, he is entitled to an acquittal.

# INSTRUCTION NO. 47:

In this case the defendant has interposed the defense that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which he lacked the capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The law does not place upon a defendant the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not mentally responsible for his conduct at the time the act charged was committed, but only places the burden upon him to raise in your minds a reasonable doubt as to his mental responsibility. If there is in your mind a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the commission of the act alleged in the Information then this reasonable doubt must be resolved in his favor and you must acquit him of the crime charged.

# INSTURCTION NO. 48:

A person is not responsible for criminal conduct, if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, or, to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Such mental disease or defect defines the term insanity for purposes of criminal responsibility, and is the meaning of the term insanity as used in these

You will note that under this definition there are two types of mental disease or defect which will excuse conduct which would otherwise be criminal. The first is that at the time of the commission of the act the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongful nature of his conduct. The tests are: Did he have sufficient mental capacity to appreciate the character and quality of his wrongful act? Did he know and understand that it was a violation of the rights of another and in itself wrong?

The second type of insanity is a mental disease or defect of such nature that at the time of the conduct in question it prevented the defendant from conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law, even though he had substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

The mental disease or defect must be of a substantial nature before it will excuse one from responsibility for his conduct. Repeated criminal or antisocial conduct, standing alone, does not establish a mental defect or

instructions.

disease which will excuse responsibility for wrongful conduct.

2

3

# INSTRUCTION NO. 49:

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

The law presumes every man to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his criminal conduct until evidence is presented sufficient to raise in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to the mental responsibility of the accused.

This presumption of mental responsibility prevails only until a reasonable doubt is cast upon it, and the presumption merely relieves the prosecution from introducing proof that the defendant was free of mental disease or defect which affected his responsibility until that issue is raised by evidence creating a reasonable doubt as to the sanity of the accused.

If evidence tending to establish such mental disease or defect is presented, the ultimate burden of convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was within the legal test of responsibility is on the prosecution.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 50:

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

# INSTRUCTION NO. 51:

the alleged commission of the act.

Guilty by Reason of Insanity."

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21 22

\_\_

23

24

25

3,057 JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

In determining the question whether the defendant

You are instructed that if you decide to acquit the

was responsible for his conduct at the time of the alleged

commission of the act, the jury may consider all of his acts

at the time of, before, and since the alleged commission of

the act, as such acts and conduct have been shown by the

defendant's appearance and actions during the trial as a

defendant on the ground that because of mental disease or

defect he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his conduct, or, to conform his conduct

to the requirement of the law, your verdict must be "Not

circumstance in determining his mental capacity at the time of

evidence, and the jury has the right to consider the

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R. 10940 Hollandale Drive Boise, Idaho 83705 I INSTRUCTION NO. 52:

2

3

4

5

6

7

During your examination as prospective jurors you learned that in Idaho the Legislature has provided an automatic and mandatory death penalty for First Degree Murder. You are hereby advised that the death penalty is in no way applicable to a conviction for the lesser offenses of Murder in the

8

9

Even though you have knowledge of the foregoing facts, you are instructed that it is not within your province

Second Degree or Voluntary Manslaughter.

11 12

10

punishment. That feature of the case is one solely for the Legislature as to First Degree Murder and solely for the Court

to concern yourselves with the guestion of penalty or

13

14

as to Murder in the Second Degree and Voluntary Manslaughter.

15

Therefore, I instruct you not to concern yourselves with the question of penalty or punishment. Your duty as jurors is

16 17

solely to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and

18

upon that question and that question alone you, as jurors, are

19

to vote and return your verdict.

20

21

INSTRUCTION NO. 53:

22

23

24

25

The Court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability

of some of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions
you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such
instructions, the fact that it has been given must not be taken
as indicating an opinion of the Court that the instruction will
be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction
applies only to a state of facts which you find does not
exist, you will disregard the instruction.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 54:

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of their deliberations are matters of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a juror at the outset to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on the case or to state how he intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, his sense of pride may be aroused, and he may hesitate to change his position even if shown that it is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are judges.

#### INSTRUCTION NO. 55:

Both the State and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror.

It is the duty of each of you to consider the

evidence for the purpose of arriving at a verdict if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but should do so only after a discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other jurors.

You should not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is erroneous. However, you should not be influenced to decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them, favor such a decision.

### INSTRUCTION NO. 56:

Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of your number as foreman.

This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous. When you arrive at a verdict, the foreman will sign it and you will return it into open court.

In arriving at your verdict you should not resort to any means or methods of chance.

Forms of verdict suitable to any conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with these instructions.

DATED this 21st day of October, 1975.

/S/ J. Ray Durtschi, District Judge. 22

24

1 November 3, 1975 4:10 p.m. 2 THE COURT: This is the time scheduled for further 3 proceedings in the case of the State of Idaho vs Thomas Eugene 4 Creech. I understood at the last proceedings in Shoshone 5 County that the defendant was willing to waive his right to have these proceedings had in Shoshone County, is that correct, 6 7 Mr. Robinson? 8 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Creech, do you agree to these proceedings 10 here in Ada County? 11 MR. CREECH: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: I note that there has now been filed several 13 motions by the defendant; motion for new trial, motion to set 14 aside verdict, motion for appointment as court-appointed 15 counsel. These were just filed today and haven't been noted 16 for hearing. Of course it would be appropriate that these 17 matters be heard before any further proceedings are had. What 18 do counsel desire as far as further proceedings on these matters 19 Mr. Robinson? 20 MR. ROBINSON: I'm prepared to go ahead at this time, 21 Your Honor. 22 MR. REMAKLUS: We're prepared to proceed, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: You're prepared to hear all of these motions 24 today? 25 MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20 21

22

23

24

25

two motions then. Do you want to present those jointly, Mr. Robinson, at this time --

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- motion for new trial and for appointment of counsel?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, sir. First of all, Your Honor, I filed a motion for the new trial based upon the four grounds, the first of which the Court ruled upon in a pre-trial proceedings, that is of dispensing the jury and trying this matter to the Court which I believe that we have already filed memorandum on, and are moving the Court at this time in regard to the new trial to reconsider the previous motion and reconsider the memorandum that has been filed.

The second is for allowing the jurors to be challenged or dismissed for cause based solely upon their nonbelief in the capital punishment, some of which were passed. I'm sure the record shows, Your Honor, in Wallace, based upon mutual stipulation. Mutual stipulation sometimes going to other factors regarding individual jurors, but over the objection of defense counsel, on, I think, two or three that occurred during the first three days in the selection of the jury, and we have filed our memorandum and citations today, Your Honor, and I'm not sure whether the State desires to respond to that written memorandum.

And for the third cause, denial after the offer of

proof to go into the testimony regarding the admission of the Satanic Bible and the giving of testimony of the clergy, and others, on their realism of God and the existence of Satan;

And for the denial, after the offer of proof, before admission of the testimony of the polygraph examiner and results of his polygraph examination. That we have not filed a written memorandum with the Court as yet. That is a matter that was discussed and considered by the Court during the period of trial in Wallace. We do submit the motion for new trial and the memorandum that we have filed today for the Court's consideration.

On the other motion for appointment of courtappointed counsel, Your Honor, I'm sure that you, Judge
Durtschi, are well aware of the entire aspects of this case
that took place from November of 1974 up to and including the
time that was previously scheduled for trial in Cascade with
Ward Hower as court-appointed counsel and my subsequent coming
into the case June the 6th of this year, 1975; and we were
acting at that time or I was acting at that time and through
the trial that occurred in Wallace on a retained basis,
retained basis not having to do with my financial renumeration
whatsoever but rather the case having been taken for providing
this defendant a fair trial in all of the charges that were
filed against him which included many aspects of the publicity
that had been released and published prior to this trial and

prior to my admission into the case.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

We are at a point however at this time. Your Honor, when appeals are necessary and will follow as a matter of course, must follow as a matter of course regarding the verdict and the sentence that will be pronounced by this Court. It has been an extreme financial hardship worked upon the professional association that I now have with Mr. Robert Jones, and for this reason we have moved the Court for appointment for further representation of Mr. Thomas Eugene Creech as courtappointed counsel so that the normal minimal fees allowed would be provided for further representation. The transcript of this case being a lengthy case would be paid for also by the State on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and such other courts as might an appeal be taken to.

I have filed in conjunction with that motion, Your Honor, my affidavit that sets these matters forth to and including the sum total that has been compiled by my office of the expenditures that have been made in excess of \$11,000.00.

The other motion as the Court has already indicated, the motion to set aside the verdict will be heard then December the 4th after the memorandum as counsel has advised the Court.

MR. REMAKLUS: Your Honor, of course on point number one it was taken care of up in Wallace when the defendant asked to dispense the jury and Your Honor has already ruled on that.

Point number two, for jurors to be challenged on

non-belief and capital punishment, I don't believe is a fair statement of what happened in Wallace, Idaho in the jury selection.

As far as the Satanic Bible, and for the same reason that this testimony was not admitted was never shown to be relevant and material. Certainly no foundation was ever laid for any such testimony as to the Satanic Bible or the realism of God and the existence of Satan.

And of course the Courts of Idaho have never allowed polygraph examinations to be introduced in evidence. And in addition thereto as you will recall the examiner who was on the stand was not a qualified examiner anyway.

I think on all four points that the motion for new trial should be denied.

I'm really not prepared to respond to the affidavit in support of a motion for court-appointed counsel. That's what we have the office of the public defender in Valley County for, is to represent indigent defendants, and I think we have gotten into maybe a cross fire here with the public defender retired from this case sometime ago, but I would think that very careful consideration should be given any appointment of court-appointed counsel and certainly if our county is going to now have to come in and start paying counsel if would only be from this point forward and certainly nothing in the past, Your Honor.

ð

Thank you.

MR. ROBINSON: On that point, Your Honor, may the record be clear that I'm not asking for reimbursement of my past expenditures that my office has made, and the motion for appointment of court-appointed counsel would only be for any services from this point forward.

THE COURT: I think all of the grounds for motion for new trial have heretofore been considered in some detail in connection with the trial of this action except the one point perhaps of dismissal of all jurors for objection to capital punishment. For the other grounds I'm going to deny the motion for the same reasons that these matters were not permitted into evidence at the time of trial. I think the same reasons still hold true and would adhere to the ruling of the trial court on these issues prior to trial and during the course of the trial.

My recollection, as far as the other point on the jurors dismissed for objection to capital punishment is that no juror was excused solely for personal objection or opposition to capital punishment. In fact it is my recollection that several jurors we had on the jury, at least there were some that were passed, I didn't keep track on the challenges-- pre-emptory challenges whether all of these finally were discharged on pre-emptory challenges or not, but there were several that were retained for cause who did have personal

23

24

25

objection to the death penalty and capital punishment. As I recall the two instances where defense counsel's challenge was overruled the panel members not only expressed opposition to the capital punishment but also indicated very clearly that they couldn't fairly consider the issue of guilt or innocence under the mandatory capital punishment statute because of their opposition to capital punishment. As I recall, all jurors who were opposed to capital punishment but still felt in spite of that opposition they could fairly consider the issue of guilt or innocence were retained on the jury panel, at least for cause, and my understanding of the case cited by counsel did not preclude challenge where the feeling is so strong against capital punishment that it would impair or prevent a juror from fairly considering the issue of guilt or innocence so that a juror would not vote for guilt under any state of the evidence, and it is my recollection that these two jurors were excused over -- or excuse me -- that the two challenges that were denied fell into that category, so I'm going to deny the motion for new trial in all respects.

On the other motion, the motion for appointment of counsel, of course the record shows that at one point in this proceeding the defendant did have court-appointed counsel in accordance with the statutory procedure that has been adopted by Valley County to have a public defender system. That public defender was permitted to withdraw and counsel, privately

retained counsel was substituted instead of the public 1 defender. I frankly feel obligated if I were to appoint counsel at this time to reappoint the public defender because that's the provision that Valley County has made for representtation for needy defendants, and I feel that it really would be unfair to ask an attorney to come back into the case after he has been replaced for purpose of trial to handle the appeal, so I'm simply going to deny the motion for appointment of counsel and deny any leave for you to withdraw, Mr. Robinson, and require you to continue to represent the defendant on his appeal in this matter and all further proceedings. I do that without prejudice to the defendant making a showing in support of request to have the County pay for the transcript in this matter. Upon a proper showing of indigency by the defendant as far as payment for the transcript I would entertain a motion to require the County to pay for the transcript.

2

3

4

5

6

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ROBINSON: That, Your Honor, is what I was getting to before.

I do accept the continued representation of Mr. Thomas Eugene Creech for purposes of appeal. I do at this time move the Court for allowance for the transcript of the case to be furnished without cost to the defendant for the reasons that I have stated. The cost would be prohibitive to the continued representation of our professional association.

THE COURT: I would like the record to be supported by 1 2 affidavit by the defendant in that regard. I think that is 3 customary. MR. ROBINSON: All right, Your Honor, I'll have that 4 prepared and filed with the Court. 5 THE COURT: Any opposition to that? 6 MR. REMAKLUS: No. No opposition to the motion after 7 the showing made by the defendant's attorney, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: All right, the remaining motion then will 9 be continued for argument to December the 4th at 3:30 and 10 all further proceedings of this matter will be continued to 11 12 December 4th at 3:30. The defendant is remanded to the custody of the 13 14 Ada County Sheriff. MR. ROBINSON: From that, Your Honor, is it my under-15 standing that Mr. Creech will be held here in the Ada County 16 Jail for that period of time until the motion on December the 17 18 4th has been heard? THE COURT: Yes, unless some other motion for other 19 20 custodial arrangements. 21 MR. ROBINSON: No, sir. THE COURT: We will be in recess then. 22 23 24 END 25

U

Firman versus Georgia and, at the onset, I would like the record to show that I am totally convinced that you, Judge Durtschi, have thoroughly studied that case, Firman versus Georgia, and the other cases.

I am sure that the thoroughness that I have seen of you in presiding in this matter over the period of the last year or more, that you have been very conscientious in your studies of this particular decision and the ramifications that they have upon this particular case.

First of all, I'm sure the Court also is totally aware of the provisions of 18-4003 in the degrees of murder as it read prior to the Firman versus Georgia decision, wherein it included a descretionary function on the part of the jury, or the Judge for murder in the first degree and setting forth the meaning of those degrees and 18-4004, the punishment for murder.

It did state that every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death, or be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life and the jury may decide which punishment shall be inflicted. The case of Firman versus Georgia addressed itself specifically to that discretion power on the Court or the jury; saying that that portion was unconstitutional.

The re-enactment as the Court is aware of, was re-enactment that made murder in the first degree a mandatory sentence of death; reading "every person guilty of murder in the

1 | first degree shall suffer death."

Our brief addressed itself to the fact that when the Legislature of the State of Idaho re-enacted this statute all that they did was delete a portion of the discretion, but did not take out the discretion that still is in the statute and that is, specifically, if the jury dislikes or has prejudice, known or unknown, they still have that discretion of finding a person guilty of murder in the second degree; preventing the penalty, or if they do, during the course of the trial, have prejudiced or prejudices, are developed, they can find murder in the first degree, thereby they are still exercising the same discretion that Firman versus Georgia said was not proper and was in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendments.

It is our position that the re-enactment has done nothing to cure those ailments that were found.

Now, the State, in response to our brief, Your Honor, did cite several cases and each of those cases I have checked over thoroughly and the one in Arizona that reversed and -- excuse me, that affirmed the conviction and the sentence was reduced to life imprisonment, was a case almost specifically in line and on all fours with the State versus Creech case that is now before the Court.

On Page 254 of that decision; which is the citation of 506 Pacific Reporter second, commencing at Page 248,

on Page 254 they set out specifically the provisions of the statute which did include the words "at the discretion of the jury trying the person charged therewith, or upon a plea of guilty, the Court shall determine the punishment."

Now, there is just not that much difference between what that Court found in that case and used as a criterion for setting aside the death penalty that was found in that case than what there was in the previous statute here in the State of Idaho and what the re-enactment statute in the State of Idaho now contains.

The discretion is still there and our Idaho

Legislature just has not cured that and, therefore, we urge the

Court, in the instant case, based upon these citations to uphold

the conviction, but set aside the verdict of First Degree Murder

and reduce the sentence to life imprisonment.

Now, the second portion of our challenge, Your Honor goes specifically to the death penalty itself as being a cruel and inhuman punishment.

Five of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices addressed themselves to this particular question, hearing the arguments in January of 1972 in rendering that decision in Firman versus Georgia in June of 1972.

There have been many cases that have attempted to address themselves to the application of the law as set forth in Firman versus Georgia and presently there are several cases

before the U.S. Supreme Court to make this decision as to whether or not they will declare that the death penalty, in and of itself, is unconstitutional.

We have urged the Court, based upon the decisions that have been made and written in that case to exert itself in this case and find that the death penalty, in and of itself, is unconstitutional because in this day and age it does violate the human dignity of our society.

Now, in making these comments to you as the Court, Judge Durtschi, I want to possibly put in a personal comment. I am not unmindful of what the death penalty is. In my legal career I've been called upon to be a witness to two executions by hanging back in the late 40's. And I have heard and participated in a lot of the arguments, arguments propounded by many across this nation, one Mel Beli in San Francisco, when he was in the discussion with many of us and, specifically that of Mr. Bugliosi of Los Angeles when Melvin Beli made the comment "Have you ever been a witness to an execution?" And that being countered by Mr. Bugliosi saying "Have you ever been a witness to a murder?"; to which Beli replied that he had not. There is the confrontation.

Now, these Justices have spoken to the fact that the death penalty is and of itself contrary to the dignity of man at this stage in the history of our society and I believe that is. I am mindful of all of the arguments regarding the

death penalty being a deterrent to the commission of the serious crimes by other persons. The statistics do not bear that out. I'm sure that this Court, in knowing the full factors of this case and all of the evidence that was produced has wrestled with this particular problem in this particular case.

The State in its response has asked the Court to rubber-stamp and not challenge, or take unto itself a ruling according to this Court's conscience and I, for the life of me, cannot see that to be a valid method or procedure. To me it seems that the judicial system in this United States is made up of each one of the courts, from the District level to the State Appellate Court to the U.S. Supreme Court and that we need not always wait for the nine Justices in Washington, D.C. to give us direction. They have given us their thoughts and ideas as long ago as June of 1972 in regards to the death penalty being contrary to the dignity of man.

In the course of the history that we've gained at this point I urge the Court at this time to exert itself in light of all of the words that have been placed before the Court to find that the death penalty, in and of itself, is not constitutional under the written Constitution of the State of Idaho and under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

I believe in doing this we have set the stage for this matter to come before all of society and do the real and

proper thing that we must do on capital punishment. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. THOMAS: If the Court please. Your Honor, Mr. Robinson has referred to the guidelines set down in Firman versus Georgia and he suggests that the Statute enacted by the Idaho Legislature does not comply with those guidelines. As the Court is no doubt aware, there aren't any guidelines in Firman versus Georgia. There was a short opinion holding the death penalty not constitutionally applied on cruel and unusual punishment grounds and, in that particular case, it was followed by nine separate opinions by every member of the Court and none of them agreed with any of the others. So, it can't be said that there is any consensus in Firman versus Georgia with respect to what circumstances must be taken before the death penalty is unconstitutional.

Mr. Robinson argues that the discretionary problem, and I might note at this point that it appears that the one thread running through Firman versus Georgia is that the death is not constitutionally applied if it's discriminatorily applied to certain classed or categories of people; in the case of Firman versus Georgia, black people.

Mr. Robinson argues that because the jury has the discretion to find the defendant's guilt of a lesser offense that that same kind of discretion marks this statute as defective. But, the fact of the matter is that Firman versus Georgia

simply doesn't address itself at all to that kind of discretion.

It is always within the province of the jury to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense if the defendant shows that. It would not be proper for a jury to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense if the evidence showed that he was guilty of a higher offense and the instructions of the Court to the jury in a case provides for that.

In addition, the question of Federal Constitutionality of this kind of statute is presently before the United States

Supreme Court in the case which the Court has held over for consideration of this term.

Since the Court is considering these very questions, it seems that it would be premature for this Court to do anything but rely upon the presumption of the validity of the legislative enactment and to pronounce upon the constitutionality of the death penalty on cruel and unusual punishment grounds and those questions are presently being litigated in the highest tribunal in the country.

With respect to the question of cruel and unusual punishment, the defendant's counsel suggests that this Court should exercise its conscience. But, the fact of the matter is that the Legislature has traditionally thought of as the body and the part of government properly constituted to do -- decide such questions of policy. It is up to the legislature to decide whether a penalty is cruel and unusual or whether it

isn't.

Unless it can be clearly said that it is cruel and unusual in violation of the Constitution, and I don't think there is any basis upon which that can be said about the penalty applied under this particular statute.

We ask the Court to reject the argument of the defendant's counsel and impose the statutory penalty with respect to which no discretion has been left to the Court.

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, and Counsel, Your Honor, I have, in the written memorandum that has been supplied to the Court; since the Court set this matter over for hearing back on November the 3rd, dug into and dug out of Firman versus Georgia each of the four criterion that we set forth in that memorandum separately and as to each of the arguments that were propounded and placed in that opinion; some 240 pages long, of each of the Justices' writing concurring opinions.

Those four categories, criterion which Counsel for the State says are non-existent, are as follows:

"The death penalty is degrading and fails to comport with human dignity."

Number two: "The mandatory death penalty is arbitrary and discriminatory."

Number three: "The mandatory death penalty is too severe a penalty; which is clearly and totally rejected throughout society."

Number four: "The mandatory death penalty is patently unnecessary."

We've described, with some detail and in referring to that decision, those particular areas and criterion which Firman versus Georgia does give us.

The facts of the three cases in Firman versus

Georgia are diverse enough for this Court, and any Court, to

interpret the length and breadth of the decision of the

U.S. Supreme Court was making at that time.

Our describing in detail those guidelines, which
the legislature should have known about and should have
studied in the event, that within the guidelines and scope of
Firman versus Georgia they were going to re-enact a death
penalty at all. The fact is that some 37 states, as of the
first of last month, Washington being the last that I know of,
have re-enacted the death penalty statute in their states.

In my study of those re-enactments, they've re-enacted with specificity and as to the exactness of the act and the parties that were killed as being a mandatory death penalty and leaving the jury totally out of exercising its discretion. I cite that and the specifics of the most recent state, the State of Washington, in this brief.

The Firman versus Georgia did involve race, prejudice, and it did involve prejudice because of the type of crime, or the heinous effect that was involved in said crimes.

In this particular case I believe that it was shown to the Court that a jury can even get upset because they have been told falsehoods and they have the right to ignore evidence pointing to a lesser offense and find a defendant before them guilty of the maximum offense of first degree; even though that result may have come from their own emotions, not being exercised with due deliberation and consideration of all that evidence.

Therefore, under the criterion that we have set forth in the re-enactment of the Idaho statute, it still leaves the door totally open to the exercise of that discretion which the U.S. Supreme Court says is not proper.

It leaves the door open in Idaho for our juries to still discriminate against persons because of sex, race, position, wealth, the economic position and their mannerisms and too much discretion left to them in ascertaining the degree of mentality or "insanity" if the Court please and, therefore, because of all the criterion set forth that we have brought to the attention of the Court, we feel the re-enactment of the Idaho statute does not cure that which Firman versus Georgia said was unconstitutional.

I will say nothing further in regard to the death penalty itself as, in this stage in history being a proper punishment, because, I'm sure the Court is aware of all of the opinions written by the fine jurists that wrote those opinions and set them forth in full in that 240-page decision.

HN W. GAMBEE, C.S.R.

10940 Hollandale Drive

Boise, Idaho 83705

THE COURT: Isn't it true, Mr. Robinson, that even in those states like Washington where they are more specific listing the categories of murder in which the death penalty could be imposed, still don't provide for it being imposed unless it's a first degree murder?

In other words, you can -- the concern I've had in trying to apply the -- this Firman case to the death penalty, particularly the three concurring opinions from which form the basis for the States' actions in re-enacting mandatory death penalty statutes and that's Douglas, White and Stuart who all concurred on the basis of the capricious and arbitrary nature of the application or discretion, if you follow that rationale. I have been concerned with the discretion that still is vested in determining the degree of the offense as you've indicated.

But, in thinking about it I don't see how you can ever avoid that. In other words, not if you list the categories and say, well, you are only going to apply the death penalty when a policeman is killed or when somebody kills a penitentiary guard or when they kill a hostage. As I understand those statutes you still don't even get to that stage until they find them guilty of murder in a high degree and I don't see how you can ever devise a statute that would deprive the trier of the fact of that discretion that we're talking about.

MR. ROBINSON: May I address the Court?

THE COURT: Yes.

2 3

brief, the reinstatement of that death penalty in the State of

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, as we cited on Page 7 of our

4

Washington limited itself to the killing of an on-duty

5

policeman or fireman, killing for hire, to obstruct justice or

6 7

I believe that the criterion we're speaking of here

8

9

is the combined working of 18-403, 18-404 which --

during a rape or kidnapping.

THE COURT: What verdict does the jury have to render

in that Washington statute before you get to that application?

11

10

MR. ROBINSON: It's my understanding that the actual

12

killing must have been one of those specifics.

13

THE COURT: Without any concern about intent or anything

14

like that?

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ROBINSON: I'm sure that it has the intent, Your Honor, the wording of the other, justifiable, excusable, I'm sure that that still is in the Washington Code.

THE COURT: Does the Washington Code eliminate all the degrees as to those particular categories, so it either has to be not guilty or guilty of murder in one of those categories?

MR. ROBINSON: I'm only supposing this, Your Honor, because this wording is the wording of the referendum that was just passed on the popular ballot in the State of Washington and not as yet acted upon by the legislature of the State of Washington for any clarification. The referendum has limited, in the State of Washington, the application of the death penalty by referendum to these very specifics and anything other than that. pursuant to the case cited by the State; which is the case of the State of Washington versus Brown, 509 Pacific Second, 742, where the State of Washington Supreme Court did find but that the death penalty -- just from the head-note, but that the death penalty, as determined and imposed under existing laws was not constitutional.

Prior to that case of May 3, 1973, they had a statute very similar to that which is here in the State of Idaho which brings me back to the point that I started to make of the interworking of 18-403 and 404 wherein they left in all the language of the premeditation, deliberate, willfulness. All of the discretionary hard-to-define terms that leaves so much in such a wide breadth and scope for the jury to exercise discretion in.

All of this was there and existing prior to

Firman versus Georgia and 03 was re-enacted with little, if

any, change save and except for inclusion of the police officer

acting in his line of duty.

In 4004 all they did was delete the obvious words of discretion from the previous enacted statute, 4004, leaving out "the jury may decide which punishment shall be inflicted." And leaving out the terms "shall suffer death or punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life."

So, they made very little, if any, substantive change in the context of the statute that is now in existence and that which was previously in existence prior to Firman versus Georgia. They did not address themselves to the decision, the criterion and the guidelines as set forth in Firman versus Georgia in that majority opinion.

I cannot reply to the Court with statistical data and specifics for all of the other 36 states besides Washington as to the status of what the state of their law is.

But, I do find it interesting in those seven or eight cases cited by the State, in each one of them, save and except one, the one in Southeast Reporter, and that was the case of -- I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing the name correctly, McCorqurdale, M-c-C-o-r-q-u-r-d-a-1-e versus the State of Georgia case. In all of the others cited by the State in their brief, the conviction was affirmed but they set aside the death penalty because it was not constitutional.

THE COURT: Wish to comment on that, Mr. Thomas?

MR. THOMAS: I'd just like to say one thing, Your Honor. In the past -- that is, if Mr. Robinson makes something out of the action of the people of the State of Washington in passing the referendum on the death penalty, that tends to suggest that because a majority of the people of Washington have passed a -- such a referendum that the majority of those people do not believe that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment

and I bring that up because, in one of the opinions in Firman versus Georgia there is reference to the general public feeling about this kind of penalty. It's up to the defendant.

If he means to suggest that there is some statistical basis for saying that the majority of the people of this country have concluded that the death penalty is cruel and unusual to produce before this Court some evidence of that and there hasn't been any such showing.

We don't believe that the defendant has made any case for setting aside the death penalty on these grounds.

although Mr. Robinson has been able to extract from one or the other some of these points that he's made in his brief, do not represent a consensus of opinion on that and the State doesn't believe there's any basis for believing that the Supreme Court is going to attempt to deprive jurors of the discretion to find people guilty of a lesser-included offense or to make that kind of determination relevant in assessing whether or not the mandatory death penalty statute should be set aside.

We would ask the Court, under those circumstances, to uphold the penalty that the legislature of this State has enacted.

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, may I be heard on one point that was made by Mr. Thomas of the Attorney General's office?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROBINSON: I had inserted this in my brief and I believe that it is the right interpretation of Firman versus Georgia that when they sent this back out they asked for the will of the people to be determined. Now, true, we have a republic form of government in all of the states and Idaho does not specifically provide, either in its Constitution or in its Statutes, election statutes, that we must submit a matter of this nature or magnitude to the populous or the electorate.

But, I believe that the wording in Firman versus Georgia commanded that we do so.

Now, our legislature did, as I have related in that brief, re-enacted a statute in the State of Idaho setting forth the death penalty and when it would be applied in this state. We have not tested the wind so-to-speak in the State of Idaho to determine whether or not the majority of the people of this state are, or are not, in favor of the death penalty.

I therefore feel that what they did re-enact, they re-enacted in haste, without the study of the decision and without applying the criterion, or even addressing themselves back to the populous and asking for the will of the people and with this magnitude of a sentence of death so permanent certainly that criterion that was set forth is important.

THE COURT: Of course, the Courts across the country are having continual litigation and we have sessions coming out regularly now interpreting statutes that have been passed

pursuant to Firman versus Georgia such as the Idaho Legislature did. The most recent I've seen, and I couldn't even find the advance sheets, but it was reported in a Criminal Law Reporter, came out in October; which is an Oklahoma Courts of Criminal Appeals case in which exactly the attack you are making here on the Idaho statute appears to be -- have been made from the report in the Criminal Law Reporter.

That Court, at least the summary of the decision, indicates that that Court found no Eighth Amendment problems with the Prosecutor's discretion of bringing the charge, the fact finder's ability to convict for a lesser-included offense or the Governor's right to grant clemency.

Of course, there is discretion in all of those areas they enumerate. That Court has felt that the discretion inherent in those three steps in the process do not violate the concept that, at least the concurring Judges' suggested.

In Firman versus Georgia, however, both the Oklahoma Court and, as I recall, Illinois Court, recently, both statutes, both the Oklahoma statute and the Illinois did, in the appeal process, have some clemency provisions that were discretionary and both Courts held those provisions to be unconstitutional, again, because there weren't -- they said you run into the same problem of possibility of capricious and arbitrary application without guidelines.

So, the Oklahoma Court held that part of their

 statute to be unconstitutional and, just as Illinois did. But, both Courts upheld the mandatory provision, excluding those discretionary parts of the statute. Frankly, that's the only way I can read Firman versus Georgia.

After all, you have to face up to the fact that four of the Justices dissented, four of the sitting Justices would have applied the death penalty and upheld it in that very case, two of them granted a partial, would have thrown out the death penalty permanently as unconstitutional without any limitation. Concurring Justices, Douglas, White and Stuart were the ones that all indicated they wouldn't say what their opinion would be if a mandatory statute came before them. They did all suggest that the only defect they found in the statute in those cases were that they left it up to capricious and arbitrary application.

Now, I agree that -- and I've thought about this, but there's, probably, no practical way, as long as you have to have a trier of facts making factual determinations and you have different decisions that could be made as far as the culpability of the defendant, the degree of the crime or however that's phrased as long as you have discretion in the fact finder; whether it's the Judge or jury or whatever, even discretion in the Prosecutor as to the degree that's being charged, or the category of murder that's being charged or discretion in the executive to grant clemency. It's going to

L

\_\_\_

 be impossible to ever get all discretion out of the system at some point, from the Prosecution up to the final decision on clemency by the executive.

I can't conceive of, at least a valid way, as long as you have trials and fact finding decisions to eliminate all discretion. I suppose the most you can do is assume, as the Oklahoma Court did, that at least if the discretion is fixed or under control guidelines by the law that that's all that's required and that's what's true in the discretion we're talking about here.

The only discretion that the Idaho Legislature has left, other than the discretion of the Prosecutor in bringing the charge and crime charged, the executive clemency, the only discretion the legislature has left is in the jury's finding as to the degree of the offense.

Now, that isn't an uncontrolled discretion or an arbitrary discretion or capricious. It's under instructions as to the law governing those decisions and the only alternatives I can see to these cases that are pending before the Supreme Court, they, of course, have the alternative of following Brennan's and Marshall's philosophy and just declaring the death penalty unconstitutional and is a violation of the Eighth Amendment and due process and ending the matter once and for all.

The other direction they could go is following the

concurring opinions and their suggestions as the -- try to eliminate the capricious and arbitrary application of, perhaps, tightening up the guidelines, providing that the legislatures do have to set definite categories as you've suggested Washington is doing. But, even after they've said that, if that's the way they go, I'm absolutely certain that somewhere in the statutory stream somebody is going to have to exercise some discretion before they even can ever make a finding in finding a person guilty of the category of offense that requires the imposition of a mandatory death penalty.

That leaves me at this point with these alternatives, it seems. I could, as I say, just go as you've suggested,
Mr. Robinson, accept two Justices of the United States
Supreme Court's approach and I think they are the only two that really went that far and just say that it's a denial of due process, it's cruel and unusual punishment and hold it unconstitutional. The only support I'd have for that decision is, as I say, two Justices of the United States
Supreme Court in their concurring opinions, because I don't read it -- they certainly didn't get any support for that position from the four dissenting Justices and, while some of the language in Justice Douglas' opinion would support that,
Justice Douglas, still, his final words were, he did not express an opinion on a statute that would impose a mandatory death penalty; what he would feel about that.

White and Stuart, of course, indicated quite affirmatively that it seemed to me that they felt that kind of a statute would be justifiable and could be upheld. In view of the fact that that same question is now before the United States Supreme Court, it seems to me it would be presumptuous to, at this point, just say this Court determine it's unconstitutional with no more support in the case law than exists for that decision at this point.

So, I'm going to not follow that alternative.

Once you abandon that position and indicate that it could be constitutionally applied, if you eliminate capricious and arbitrary nature of the application, then it seems to me it does become a legislative matter and our legislature has spoken on it and I feel to accept that legislative dictate at this time.

So, I'm going to deny the defendant's motion. I would say this, however, as a caveat.

I'm sure that it won't be necessary, in view of the nature of stays inherent in the appeal process for me to exercise this, but I would tell you this, Mr. Robinson. If it ever became appropriate that I certainly would exercise whatever jurisdiction I have to stay any execution of penalty in this case until the United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue. I say that's rather redundant, because I think that would follow as a matter of course in the way in an appeal

process, but --

2

MR. ROBINSON: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

3

5

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Any further matters to come before the Court at this time, before the matter -- other than disposition? MR. ROBINSON: If I may address the Court, yes,

Your Honor. I assume that this is -- the Court is asking whether or not there is any legal or just cause that we should not submit at the present time to this Court pronouncing sentence and I'm requested by Mr. Thomas Eugene Creech for a continuance and during that continuance this Court to further order psychiatric examination of him and a pretrial -- or presentence investigation, a thorough presentence investigation conducted by an unbiased group of persons, or persons that have been appointed to perform this function here in the State of Idaho.

My reasons, Your Honor, for requesting his further psychiatric examination prior to this Court pronouncing its sentence is, that since his return from Shoshone County and, especially during the last three weeks, he has not felt that he has had thought processes that were in line with normal and usual behavior activities and being fearful of this himself he has asked that I do request further continuance for sentencing until further psychiatric examination has been made.

In addition to that, Your Honor, before the Court does pronounce sentence, and I would ask the Court to declare

a short recess and allow Counsel to discuss a matter in chambers with the Court and with the defendant being present.

THE COURT: Well, what's the State's response to that first request?

MR. REMAKLUS: Request for psychiatric examination and presentence?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. REMAKLUS: Of course, we will resist that,

Your Honor, this being the type of case where presentence
investigation, the discretion has been taken away from the

Court. The function and purpose of a presentence investigation
has been eliminated by the legislature in the mandatory
death penalty.

Since the Court has no discretion, excepat as to pronounce the judgment as determined and established by the legislature, this results only in a stay of pronouncement of judgment and performs no useful function; either for the defendant, except to prolong pronouncement of judgment. But, no matter what a presentenc investigation report would show, the judgment still remains and any conferences in the Court's chambers in the presence of the defendant I would suggest be —the Court takes the Reporter and also has him present.

THE COURT: Well, I'd like to have this matter further pursued because the statute governing the mental disease and defect defense not only limits itself to trial and conviction,

4 5

but also punishment. As I read it, it provides, "No one suffering from mental disease or defect can be punished or have punishment inflicted."

I think that matter probably has to be further pursued. We used to have a statute that expressly covered the infliction of the death penalty and sanity hearing coupled with that provided that penalty couldn't be imposed if the defendant was suffering from insanity. At the time that statute was repealed by our new mental disease and defect statute and that statute still provides "that no person who, as a result of mental disease or defect lacks the capacity to understand the proceeding, shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished."

So, I assume that statute still applies to the punishment phase of the disposition.

I'm going to continue this matter for further proceedings on that request by the defendant and I, in view of the nature of these Thursday arraignment proceedings I'm going to set it on some day other than a regular criminal arraignment day.

MR. REMAKLUS: Could we have it, Your Honor, in Cascade on the first Wednesday of the month?

THE COURT: Well, I'm not assigned up there this term of the court so I wouldn't be there.

MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you.

1	THE COURT: I can set it on January the 6th at, say,
2	3:30?
3	MR. REMAKLUS: What day of the week is that?
4	. THE COURT: A Tuesday.
5	MR. REMAKLUS: Tuesday?
6	MR. ROBINSON: We have no conflicts on that date,
7	Your Honor.
8	MR. THOMAS: Is that at 3:30, Your Honor?
9	THE COURT: Yes.
10	MR, REMAKLUS: I have a criminal jury trial set for
11	that date.
12	THE COURT: How about January 13th? That's the next
13	week?
14	MR. REMAKLUS: Could we set it, Your Honor, alternatively
15	on one of those two days, maybe we can have a recess so I can
16	call my office. I don't want to delay this.
17	THE COURT: I could give you another date to consider
18	if you want to do that, January 6th, 13th or 16th.
19	MR. REMAKLUS: What day of the week is the 16th?
20	THE COURT: 16th is a Friday.
21	MR. REMAKLUS: I'm clear on that day.
22	MR. ROBINSON: That's fine, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: All right, make it January 16th, then, at
24	3:30.
25	MR. REMAKLUS: Do I understand this is on under

18-210 for mental examination and we're not, Your Honor, going to order a pretrial in this, Your Honor? THE COURT: Presentence? No. If we're going to explore that request at that time and also at that time we can take up your request, Mr. Robinson, I take it. I just don't have time today to take up any matters in chambers. MR. ROBINSON: That's fine, Your Honor. MR. REMAKLUS: Thank you. THE COURT: All right, the defendant will be remanded to the custody of the Ada County Sheriff, then. (Whereupon the matter was concluded.) 

## BOISE, IDAHO, FRIDAY, JANUARY 16, 1976, 3:30 P.M.

THE COURT: This was the time on which the case of
State versus Creech was continued to fix a time certain for
consideration of certain matters you raised at the last hearing,
Mr. Robinson.

I note for the record that you have now filed a formal Motion, making your suggestion, the matter of record as request the matter of a report for further psychiatric examination and evaluation and I take it that's the matter that is before the Court for hearing at this time?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It seems to me that matter needs to be disposed of before any other proceedings would be appropriate.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor, and I would like to urge the Court's consideration for that Motion at this time, with the exception of the last three and a half lines and I would like to delete from that Motion that the evaluation examination be done at the psychiatric section at the Idaho State Penitentiary; that said examination, of course, be conducted here in the Ada County Jail. But, I would still continue to urge that the examination and evaluations that are done, be at the expense of the State of Idaho.

THE COURT: Do you have any response, Mr. Remaklus?

MR. REMAKLUS: Your Honor, we're not going to really, seriously resist the motion because I think it would be futile to do so.

I would suggest, however, that in the event that Your Honor orders a psychiatric evaluation that it be performed by Dr. Michael Estess who is acquainted with the defendant, has the history of the defendant in his files and I would further ask that this matter be set for -- the evaluation be ordered immediately and that we return to court two weeks from this date.

THE COURT: Wish to respond, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, if I may be heard further on that,

Your Honor.

I have talked with Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend, who has previously conducted a psychiatric examination and evaluation of Thomas Eugene Creech on behalf of the State and, as the Court is well acquainted, that Michael Estess had also conducted his own independent examination and evaluation.

Dr. Heyrend's own comments to me were that he did not want to be reappointed for a subsequent examination and evaluation because of the numerous times, the involvement that he has had with Tom Creech prior to this time and, that since this is an examination specifically to determine the mental capacity, abilities and evaluation of Thomas Eugene Creech since the date of the trial and the jury verdict, it would be

our position that the Court should appoint a psychiatrist other than Michael Estess or Dr. F. LaMarr Heyrend and we would suggest to the Court the name of Dr. Humiston, psychiatrist here in Boise and would request the Court appoint Dr. Humiston to conduct his examination at State expense here at the Ada County Jail.

If it please the Court, a period of two weeks I don't believe is sufficient time for the thorough examination to take place. I would suggest that not only because of the length of time the examination would take, but also because of personal commitments that I have out of state that it be not less than three weeks before the Court asks us to return and the report itself be returnable by the psychiatrist.

MR. REMAKLUS: If I may respond, Your Honor.

These are the reasons that I think that Dr. Estess would be qualified.

We're talking about competency or incompetency subsequent to trial. I think someone who made a prior examination would be much better qualified to make the evaluation at that point than would a stranger to the case.

Regardless of what your order may be, we'd like to be heard upon the date after you determine whether or not you are going to order the examination, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, as I read Section 18-210, it provides that "No person who, as a result of mental disease or defect,

lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures."

I feel that the defendant is entitled to raise the issue of his mental capacity to understand further proceedings involved with a sentencing and punishment and that he is entitled to an examination for that purpose and limited to that purpose.

I understand, and I don't understand the defendant's motion to request that there be any attack upon the determination that's already been made in the trial of this case and prior examinations as to capacity to be tried and, also as to responsibility for the acts committed.

As I understand the motion simply raises the issue of any change in condition that's occurred since the trial and the examination would be limited to that issue. But, I will order an examination for that purpose; to determine the present capacity of the defendant to understand further proceedings in this court that might be taken.

In the initial defense of mental disease or defect that was raised in this action, the Court, pursuant to the statute, appointed Dr. Estess to make the examination for the Court. I see no reason why I should not continue that same appointment for this further evaluation so far as the

Court is concerned.

I do note, under the statute the defendant has a right, if he wishes to be examined by another psychiatrist of his own choice that he has that right and I would afford you

why, I'll make that appointment.

MR. REMAKLUS: Will that be at the expense of Valley County, then, Your Honor?

that right, Mr. Robinson. If Dr. Humiston is your request,

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROBINSON: Then you are, in effect, Your Honor, appointing both psychiatrists to appoint --

THE COURT: So far as the Court's duty to appoint a psychiatrist, I'm appointing Dr. Estess and I'm granting you the request to --

MR. ROBINSON: We do, on the record, request the appointment of Dr. Carl Humiston.

THE COURT: Well, I think the requirement, as far as the examination, will depend on when the next proceedings will be appropriate. But, I, of course, feel we do need to have a date certain but, if the doctors can't accommodate their examinations to that date, why, it will simply have to be changed.

Being somewhat familiar with their schedules for

-- as far as examination, I think, Mr. Robinson's suggestion of
three weeks is probably more appropriate because we've had

psychiatrists.

22.

However, I have, at this time and have just been handed by Mr. Creech a handwritten request and I could either enter that into the evidence at this time for the Court's examination or read it into the record; whichever the Court prefers.

May I pass it through the Bailiff to the Court?

THE COURT: Yes. Well, let me advise -- Mr. Creech

covers two matters in his papers and at least -- that require

action by the Court, a request regarding further psychiatric

evaluation, also requests that he be permitted to move for a

new trial on the ground, I assume, of newly discovered

evidence, phraseology in terms of the statute, or rule.

I think I need to resolve the matter of the fitness of the defendant to proceed and understand further proceedings before I can entertain any further proceedings in the matter.

So, it would not be appropriate for me to consider these matters, other than a further psychiatric examination at this time.

As I understand the statutory procedure, either party can contest the findings of the report, if so, the only thing left to do is to set a hearing date to hear any evidence in opposition to those findings. If no one desires to submit evidence in opposition of findings, then it would be necessary for me to make a finding in accordance with the reports.

Mr. Remaklus indicates he does not wish to contest the finding of the reports. Mr. Creech, apparently, personally does want to contest the findings of the report, is that right, Mr. Creech?

MR. CREECH: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Which we'll note for the record. However, you say you don't contemplate any new or independent evidence in opposition of the reports, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, I'd like the record to reflect the fact that both Dr. Estess and Dr. Heyrend had written reports prior to my being into the case and subsequent to my entering the case, around the first of June of 1975; that I had thoroughly examined both doctors on direct and cross-examination during the time of trial; that it was at my request that Dr. Carl Humiston was requested to be a psychiatrist for evaluation, or any circumstances subsequent to the trial.

I must advise the Court at this time that I have no evidence of my own that are in conflict with either Dr. Estess nor Dr. Humiston's nor any of Dr. Heyrend's reports and, therefore, that basically is the reason I would have no further contest to make on the reports because I just have no independent source of any other evidence of a contrary result.

I must also state for the benefit of the record and the Court that the papers that have just been delivered to the Court, I have not had an opportunity to read, any more than

22

23

24

25

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, I have already made my comments to the Court and for the purpose of the record at this time I do wish to advise the Court that it is Mr. Creech's desire for examination hearing of the doctors.

THE COURT: Well, I assume when you say that that you are intending to participate in that hearing, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you care to subpoena both doctors and examine them at that hearing?

MR. ROBINSON: I would assume that is what Mr. Creech does desire, yes, Your Honor. As I have advised --

THE COURT: Is that your desire?

MR. CREECH: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Well, I want it clearly understood in connection with this hearing, Mr. Robinson, you are still the attorney of record in this matter and I'm not allowing you to withdraw in connection with this hearing and any examination of the doctors that's conducted will be conducted by you and not by Mr. Creech.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor, I understand that.

I had no other intention nor desire to express to the Court, other than that.

THE COURT: How long do you think that will take, Mr. Robinson?

MR. ROBINSON: More than likely, three to four hours,

Your Honor.

2

THE COURT: Well, we may have to change, depending upon the availability of the doctors, but I'll set it for March 25th at 9:00 if it's agreeable with Counsel.

4

5

MR. REMAKLUS: What day of the week is that, Your Honor?

6

THE COURT: Thursday.

7

MR. REMAKLUS: I think it's all right. I don't have my

8

diary with me, but I think it's all right.

9

THE COURT: It will be up to Counsel, of course, to procure the subpoenaes or procure the attendance of any

11

witnesses they wish to testify at that hearing. The Court

12

isn't going to call anyone on its own.

13

have to subpoena both doctors. I ask at this time whether or

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I anticipate, Your Honor, that I'll

14

not my understanding would be that this would be at the

15 16

expense of the State?

17

THE COURT: Well, yes, all the other expenses have been,

18

90 ---

19

20

21

22

23

24

Z-1

25

MR. ROBINSON: And at this time I would like to renew the previous motion that was made, Your Honor, to insert me in the status of court-appointed counsel for all of these hearings and in the same status for any appeals that may follow.

THE COURT: That motion has been ruled on once and that ruling will stand.

MR. ROBINSON: All right, sir.

1	THE COURT: All right, the defendant will be remanded
2	until March 25th at 9:00.
3	Court's in recess.
4	(Whereupon the matter was concluded.)
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
1	

1	BOISE, IDAHO, THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1976, 9:10 A.M.
2	
3	
4	THE COURT: This was the time scheduled for the hearing
5	on the evaluation of that was ordered pursuant to the
6	motion of the defendant.
7	Defendant ready to proceed?
8	MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: State ready?
10	MR. REMAKLUS: Yes, Your Honor.
11	THE COURT: I understand Dr. Humiston is here.
12	DR. HUMISTON: Yes.
13	THE COURT: Doctor, if you'd stand up and raise your
14	right hand and be sworn, please.
15	
16	CARL E. HUMISTON,
17	produced for cross-examination, having been first duly sworn,
18	took the stand and testified as follows:
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
1	

Q. Any others?

A American Society of Clinical Hypnosis, International Academy of Preventive Medicine, Academy of Orthomolecular Psychiatrists and the Northwest -- North Pacific Society of Neurology and Psychiatry.

Q. All right. Dr. Humiston, would you advise the Court what your involvement has been in private practice?

How long have you been in private practice?

A. I've been in private practice, either full time or part time ever since 1962. Four years full time, then I was director of psychiatric residency training at State Hospital in Washington and still some part-time practice for five years, then full-time private practice again for three years in Tacoma, Washington until I moved here a year and a half ago, full-time private practice here.

Q All right. Dr. Humiston, were you requested by this Court, or by me as Counsel for Mr. Thomas Eugene Creech, the gentleman sitting next to me, to conduct an examination for the determination of the mental capacity of Thomas Eugene Creech?

A. Yes.

Q Now, prior to conducting that examination did you take, or were you advised of any history of Mr. Creech?

A. Not really. I never looked at any medical, clinical or psychiatric records and I had looked at records in the newspaper very superficially and had not really been following

- Besides yourself and Mr. Creech, who else, if
- I had two fellow professionals who were accompanying me in my activities in a student status. I brought them along.
  - Would you name those parties?
- I'm trying to think of her name. Well, one was Jane and I can't remember her last name off the top of my head, who is a professional from the Mental Health Center in Richland, Washington. The other one was William Reimer.
  - And where does he live?
  - And what is his capacity and profession?
- He's an -- I've been talking with him about some of the matters of diet and mental health and he asked if he could sit in and ask Mr. Creech some questions, which he did. Some of the things that I was also interested in turned out to be not relevant to his case. So, these people were essentially there as observers, did not really participate; other than a couple of questions about diet.
- All right. Dr. Humiston, did you ascertain at the commencement of your examination as to whether or not Thomas Eugene Creech was under the influence of any drug
- Yes. While waiting for him to be brought to the room I asked the jailer to tell me what medications he was

receiving and he went through the drawer of containers of

to the point of making a person dull, or confused. He did not appear dull or confused to me and, therefore, as far as I'm concerned, the medications did not affect my examination.

Now, I realize that he may have been in a different mood if he had not been taking them, but in my opinion they were not of sufficient enough effect at that time of day to interfere with the examination.

- Q All right. Would you describe to the Court the characteristics, mannerisms and attitudes of Thomas Eugene Creech at the onset of your examination on that 4th day of February, 1976?
- A. I would say that he appeared very much as he does now sitting to your left, attentive, alert, quiet, answered questions. His state of mind did not change during the half hour that I was there.

He was pleasant to me, he was cooperative in answering questions, did not give me any difficulty, did not refuse to answer any questions, actually the best you -- there weren't problems in his behavior.

- Q By that are you saying, Dr. Humiston, during this over 30 minutes there were no erratic events, behavioral on the part of Mr. Creech, no unusual erratic behavior circumstances?
  - A. That's right.
- Q. All right. And, Dr. Humiston, would you advise the Court as to what you did in regard to conducting an

examination for psychiatric purposes at this time?

A. First I asked -- oh, first I introduced myself and informed him of the purpose of my visit, showed him the copy of the Court order which I had received so that he would be fully aware of why I was there.

I then asked him what was his understanding of the nature of the further proceedings in his case. He reported to me that he was scheduled, on the 5th of March, to be sentenced for two murders, of which he was convicted of having committed in November of '74 and that he expected to be sentenced to be hung to death.

I then, at that point, I was reasonably satisfied that he understood the nature of further proceedings in his case and continued to interview him in a more general way to further assess his state of mind at present.

I asked him whether he had any present complaints. His first response was that his only complaint was some trouble sleeping. I then proceeded with further specific questiong, asking him about specific things. He said that he felt some ulcer, buring pain; that he had had constant headaches for several months, felt a little depressed, claimed to be a little confused off and on, subject to spells of irritability; said that his memory was a little bit off for the last several months.

I asked him some questions about how he ate and

other symptoms, which he did not have. So, I did a fairly comprehensive review of symptoms that I considered might be relevant and I mentioned only the ones that he came up with.

- Q Dr. Humiston, in regard to his eating habits, were those present eating habits you inquired about, or did you in fact inquire about eating habits as a child?
- A. Both, and I found childhood and present and in between eating habits to be not remarkable.
- Q. All right. Well, by the way, Dr. Humiston, at this time did you have any results of blood tolerance tests that had been done on Mr. Creech by Dr. David Weeks of Boise, sometime in the summer of 1975?

MR. REMAKLUS: I would object. I think it's outside the scope of the Court's order for the mental examination.

THE COURT: This goes into the foundation. Overruled.

THE WITNESS: I did inquire about that and I must have simply inquired by phone because I have no written records of it.

I remember inquiring of Dr. Weeks and I remember concluding that I couldn't draw much conclusion from the figures he gave me. So, I didn't even record them and I don't remember now what they were.

Q. BY MR. ROBINSON: All right. Do you recall whether or not the blood tolerance curve was unremarkable and showed a hypoglycemia or blood-sugar problem?

A. My recollection was that it was not strictly normal, but that it was not conclusively abnormal.

Q. All right. Now, would you then go ahead and tell us the balance of the evaluation, or examination you did for your evaluation?

A. The remainder of the time was spent more conversationally. He asked me to look at some of the poetry he had written and he spent a few minutes reading through some of that. My -- for the purpose of the examination I looked at the poetry to see if it showed any signs of being disorganized, dillusional or anything like that and I found no signs of abnormality displayed in the poetry. It was organized. So, I found, again, no signs of mental disorders in the poetry, as I had found none on the interview.

Q. Now, on that point, you did report on your letter to the Court in your evaluation, Dr. Humiston, you found that poetry well organized though superficial. Isn't that the word you used in your report?

- A. Yes.
- Q. What did you mean by that?

A. Well, the poetry struck me as lacking depth of feeling or understanding or artistry or any of those. It was -- we say, not the work of a mature poet, more like I would expect from, say, a high school poetry writer.

Q. All right. Now, were there any other methods that

you used in your examination, or any other conversation you used in your examination for the purpose of your analysis?

- A. Well, no other conversation. I might add that an important part of my examination is simply watching him during the whole half hour. A fair amount of my attention went to, simply, visual observations that tends to be particularly revealing of the nature of a person and that did not turn up anything different from what I've already said.
  - Q. What in particular were you looking for?
- A. I looked for body disorganization, I looked for signs of tension, switching, sense of discoordination between words and feelings; that sort of thing. I did not pick up anything remarkable by my visual observation in those regards.
- Q. All right. Dr. Humiston, then, based upon the examination that you conducted, first of all, have you advised us of your entire examination now?
  - A. Yes.
- Q. Would you tell us what your medical opinion as a psychiatrist was and what the results of your analysis were?
- A. In my opinion, at the time of my examination he was not mentally ill and I would not apply a psychiatric diagnostic label to him.
- Q You say you did not apply any diagnostic psychiatric label?
  - A That's right.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And if heretofore there has been some labeling of an antisocial behavioral pattern applied by other psychiatrists, would that be in line with your thinking as a psychiatrist?

A. It could be.

Q. What do you mean by "could be"?

A. Since my conclusion was based entirely -- or let's say 95 per cent on that half-hour interview I had with him and I'm well aware that he may have displayed patterns of behavior in the past that would deserve psychiatric labels and this would be a matter of history which was not, you know, detailed history, not available to me and not necessary for the purposes of my particular examination.

I was asked to determine his capacity to understand further proceedings against him, which I found him to be capable of and I was not asked to make a diagnosis. But, I thought it nevertheless to be appropriate to make a comment that I did not come up with my examination for a basis of basic psychiatric diagnosable label.

Q At this particular time is Tom Creech a neurotic -yeah, is Tom Creech a neurotic?

A. Not as far as I'm aware.

Q. Would this have shown up in your examination?

A. Not necessarily. See, sometimes a neurosis is

24

7 8

manifested by neurotic struggles, such as one often sees in marriages where someone will pick someone to marry who cannot supply what you want and struggle and struggle and try to get it out of that person. That sort of neurotic struggle would not have turned up in my examination of him.

See, furthermore, that sort of neurosis does not impair the capacity to understand further proceedings in a legal case and, therefore, I didn't feel it necessary to take this sort of exhaustive history that would turn up that kind of material.

- Q. All right. And did you find that Tom Creech was not a psychotic?
  - A. I did find that he was not psychotic.
  - Q. And how did you make -- strike that.

Would you describe to the Court what you feel is psychotic behavior that you did not find in Thomas Eugene Creech?

A. Well, the outstanding feature of psychotic state of mind is disorganization of attention and disorganization of thinking; that is, a person can't stay with a sentence from one end to the other, can't clearly hear, perceive or understand what's being said to him, can't come out with the words to say what he wants to say, that kind of thing. That kind of disorganization of attention and thinking and in a half hour of conversation it's pretty easy to determine whether or not a person has that kind of a disorganization and I saw

1 no sign of such disorganization in his case. 2 As a result of your interrogation and your 3 analysis of Thomas Eugene Creech, do you feel that he has 4 clear understanding of the procedures he's presently involved 5 in? A. Yes. 7 MR. ROBINSON: I -- may I have just a second, please, 8 Your Honor? 9 THE COURT: Yes. 10 (Brief delay.) 11 MR. ROBINSON: You may examine, Counsel. 12 MR. REMAKLUS: No questions, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: I have no questions. You may step down. 14 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you. 15 THE COURT: You may be excused, Doctor. 16 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 17 MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, we'd call Dr. Michael Estess, 18 if you'd come foreward, please, sir. 19 20 MICHAEL EGLING ESTESS, produced as a witness for cross-examination, being first duly 21 22 sworn, took the stand and testified as follows: 23 24 25

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

again, yes.

Q All right. And what is your understanding that you were -- what you were supposed to do in regard to that Court order?

A. Was my understanding that the question had arisen as to whether or not Mr. Creech was capable of understanding the proceedings against him and that he possibly was suffering from some mental illness subsequent — that had developed subsequent to his trial and that as a result of that mental illness that he lacked the capacity to understand the proceedings against him in some way and I was requested by the Court to see him and ascertain whether or not he did in fact — or was, in fact, suffering from any mental illness and, if so, if it impaired his capacity to understand the proceedings.

- Q Dr. Estess, on what date did you conduct your examination, or were there more than one occasions that you spent with Tom Creech?
- A. I saw Mr. Creech on two separate occasions, let's see, January the 29th, 1976 and February the 17th, 1976.
- Q. Now, prior to your first examination of Mr. Creech,
  Dr. Estess, what particular history did you have on Mr. Creech
  before going into this examination?
- A. Well, I had a history, of course, which I had obtained as a result of my initial evaluation of Mr. Creech for the Court prior to his trial.

just engaged in conversation with Tom about his present circumstances and the first interview was fairly casual. We were in -- I did not even take him into a room, we stayed pretty much in what be considered a "lobby" although most of the time we were alone in the lobby. People did go in and out, but it was a sort of a casual situation and it was, primarily, an interview-kind of proposition; where I just talked with him about where he was and what he was doing and what he was about, that sort of thing.

Q Dr. Estess, prior to conducting this examination, or during the examination, did you ascertain what, if any, prescription drugs that Mr. Creech was taking at the time?

A. Yes. I asked him what he was taking and, then, I later, at another date, I checked with the jailer who was responsible for giving his medication to him but I did -- he told me accurately on that particular day.

Q. All right. And did you isolate those particular drugs in your written report?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. All right. And would you advise us as to what you were told by Mr. Creech that he was taking in the way of prescription drugs and for what purposes?

A. Yes. He indicated he was taking something for his stomach; that he had stomach pain. He was taking Vistaril; which is a tranquilizer, mild tranquilizer. He was taking

2

3

4

5

6

vitamins, he was taking chloral hydrate; which is a sedative, hynotic to sleep, and he was taking Talwin; which is a narcotic which he said he had been on since he was in Wallace and at his trial he was taking Sinequan; which is an antidepressant which he takes at nights, also to help him with sleep.

Q. Now, if these were taken, according to the prescription, the Talwin three times a day and at night, would they have any affect upon your examination, or your analysis and opinion?

A. I think it would be more to know that he was taking medication and I think that -- but in terms of, you know, that is why I commented on it, it clearly, you know, would have to be taken into consideration.

- Q. And did you take it into consideration?
- A. Certainly did.
- All right. And to what degree of, or in what regard, did you take the drugs that he was then taking periodically through each day into consideration?
- A. Well, I saw most all of the medication that he was taking primarily described and, as far as I'm concerned, used to control some of the anxiety which he sort of chronically experiences. Although there are a variety of drugs and different families he primarily has been bothered by anxiety in the past and I think that's why he was taking it.

I think, basically, it's a minor consideration;

although I think he probably is more comfortable since he's been on his narcotic as a result of taking the medication, that's all.

- Q Now, would you describe the characteristics and mode of behavior of Tom Creech during the period of time that you interviewed him on the 29th of January?
- A. Yes. He presented in a very reasonable casual fashion, was talkative and cooperative with me, quite friendly and seemed informed and seemed relatively free of any significant anxiety at the time of the interview and manifested no significantly deviant, or abnormal behavior at all that I could tell. His general posture and demeanor was pleasant and that was his general presentation.
- Q I take it from what you've just said, then, that during this first interview there were no erratic behavior circumstances that occurred that Tom Creech participated in?
  - A. That's correct.
- Q All right. And what in particular were you searching for and how did you ascertain from the conversation that you had asked, the proper questions, done the proper things in order to evaluate Tom Creech?
- A. Well, there are a number of things. It seemed to
  me that the primary purpose of my evaluation was to understand,
  or to get some feeling for whether or not Tom had an appreciation
  of the proceedings that he was involved in; that was sort of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the whole question about my evaluating him.

So, that that was the initial tact that I took in my evaluation of him and that was to have him describe to me where he was at at this point in time and exactly what proceedings he was involved in; which he did very well.

So, after discussing that then I went on to discuss with him things that would allow me to draw some conclusions about how he was functioning in a general sense and how much he was appreciative of what was going on around him and the reality that he is presently living in. He demonstrated consistently a capacity to have appreciation of his surroundings, not only immediately, but in the recent past and he described his future in realistic terms; so that the nature of the conversation that he engaged in had, primarily to do with allowing me to assess Tom's capacity to assess his own situation and understand it and present it in reasonable fashion. At the same time I looked for, and watched for any signs that -- or indicators that might be present of serious mental illness.

There were no signs of significant mental illness from what I could tell and he seemed to articulate his circumstances very realistically to me as far as the proceedings that he was -- now that he was presently awaiting and being involved in.

In your opinion, Dr. Estess, is Tom Creech either

A.

1	(Brief delay.)
2	MR. ROBINSON: You may examine, Counsel.
3	MR. REMAKLUS: I have no questions. Thank you, Doctor.
4	THE COURT: You may step down and you may be excused,
5	Doctor, if you want to.
6	THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.
7	MR. ROBINSON: May I have just a couple more seconds,
8	Your Honor?
9	THE COURT: Yes.
10	(Brief delay.)
11	MR. ROBINSON: We have nothing further to present at
12	this time, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: State have anything further to present?
14	MR. REMAKLUS: Not at this time, Your Honor. Thank you.
15	THE COURT: We'll take a five-minute recess and, then
16	I'll hear any closing statements Counsel want to make as far
17	as this presentation before the Court.
18	(Recess taken.)
19	THE COURT: I'll hear any closing statements.
20	MR. ROBINSON: We have no closing statement to make,
21	Your Honor. I believe the testimony, of course, is here and
22	the evaluation reports speak for themselves.
23	THE COURT: Mr. Remaklus?
24	MR. REMAKLUS: We have nothing.
25	THE COURT: Well, under the statute I'll make the

finding in accordance with the reports that have been made by Dr. Humiston and Dr. Estess and find that the defendant does have capacity to understand the pending and further proceedings against him and to assist his Counsel in those proceedings.

I will make a finding to that effect. Counsel for the State will prepare appropriate findings and conclusions and order.

We have presently pending also Mr. Creech's own motion for new trial that he submitted in addition to the motion for new trial that's heretofore been ruled on submitted by Counsel.

I'll hear anything Counsel want to present on that information.

Mr. Robinson, do you have anything to say in that regard?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I do, Your Honor.

Your Honor, in regard to the comment made by Mr. Creech on two witnesses, these witnesses, although I've asked on at least three different occasions, have never been divulged to me and during my entire time of the investigation and involvement in this case I am not aware of who the two witnesses that he speaks of are.

At this time I would have no further argument to make to the Court in regard to the motions that have been handwritten by Mr. Creech.

THE COURT: Want to make any comment on that motion,

Mr. Creech?

MR. CREECH: No, sir.

THE COURT: I'm missing the rules from this set of the Code. Go down to my office and get one.

(Brief delay.)

THE COURT: Well, I'll advise Mr. Creech, since

Counsel has heretofore made the same motion on your behalf you,
however, raised a new ground in your own motion that Rule 33 of
the Idaho Criminal Rules does provide for the filing of a

motion for new trial based on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence and allows that motion to be made anytime within two
years after the final judgment.

I believe that if this rule is read in conjunction with the statute, it does require a showing in support of the motion. I'm simply pointing this out to you to let you know that you still have time to renew the motion or amplify it to conform to the statute in the rules if you want. I think, to conform to the statute and the rule, you would have to state more than you've shown in your present motion. In a sense you'd have to, by affidavit or otherwise, show what the newly discovered evidence is and show that it would be material and likely to bring about a new result in a new trial. A different result in a new trial. All that is required in support of the motion for new trial.

The other restriction of the rule is that I'm

confronted with in this case is that since there is two years within which to file such a motion the rule contemplates that an appeal might be pending in the meantime before that motion is presented. The rule provides that if an appeal is pending the Court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.

Now, as I understand the record in this case there are pending appeals already from the denial of your attorney's motion for new trial and also for the motion for setting aside the verdict and judgment of acquittal. With those appeals pending at this time I couldn't grant the motion anyway until a remand of the case on that appeal, if it is remanded. So, at this time I'm going to deny the motion, pro se motion that Mr. Creech has made without prejudice to renew if you want to within the two-year time limit, renew the motion in an amplified form to meet the requirements of the rule and the statute.

Anything further to come before the Court before we proceed with pronouncement of judgment?

MR. ROBINSON: We have nothing.

THE COURT: State have anything?

MR. REMAKLUS: We have nothing, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm required, Mr. Creech, to review the record in this case prior to pronouncing judgment. The record is somewhat lengthy but I'll have to go through it.

The record shows an Information was filed on

December 4, 1974 by the Prosecuting Attorney of Valley County charging you with two counts of murder in the first degree; the record shows you appeared on December 4, 1974 with your attorney for purposes of arraignment. At that time you were partially arraigned and the matter was continued for completion of arraignment and entry of a plea.

On January 8, 1975, which the case was continued to, you appeared again with your attorney. At that time pleas of "Not Guilty" were entered to both Count I and Count II and the matter was set for trial to commence on May 20, 1975.

On the 20th of May, 1975 the trial did commence.

On May 21, 1975 a Motion for Change of Venue was made. On

May 22nd, 1975 that Motion for Change of Venue was granted.

On June 18, 1975 an order was entered pursuant to hearing we had on June 9th, changing counsel to represent you. At that time Mr. Robinson was substituted as counsel of record as your attorney.

On July 10, 1975 an order was entered -- excuse me, on July 10, 1975 a hearing was had regarding change of venue and the place of change of venue and an order was entered on July 14, 1975 pursuant to that order and the venue was changed to Shoshone County.

On August 14, 1975, pursuant to stipulation, trial was set for October 6th, 1975 to begin in Shoshone County.

Trial did commence on October 6, 1975. On October 22nd, 1975

the verdict of the jury was rendered, a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree as to both counts.

I will ask you at this time whether you have any legal cause to show why judgment should not now be pronounced and I will tell you in this regard, Mr. Creech, you have a right at this time to make any statement that you want to.

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, Mr. Creech advises me he does not desire to make any statement at this time and, for the record, I have no further legal reason to put before the Court to prevent the sentencing and judgment being announced in this case.

THE COURT: All right. No legal cause being shown and none appearing why judgment should not be pronounced, it is the judgment of this Court that you have, having been regularly charged by an information of two counts of the crime of murder in the first degree and jury finding you guilty as charged on both counts, now, therefore, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that you, Thomas Eugene Creech, are guilty of the crime of murder in the first degree under Count I and guilty of murder of the first degree under Count II of the Information; that as punishment therefor you shall suffer death of the manner provided by the Statute of the State of Idaho to be carried out on May 21, 1976.

You are remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Ada County, Idaho, to be delivered forthwith to the proper

1 2	custody of the proper officers of the penitentiary of the State of Idaho for execution of the sentence.
3	
4	We'll be in recess.
* : 5	(Recess taken and matter concluded.)
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

## 1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 STATE OF IDAHO 88. 4 County of Ada 5 6 I, JOHN W. GAMBEE, Official Court Reporter of the 7 District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 8 Idaho, hereby certify: 9 That I attended the hearings and trial of the 10 above-entitled matter and reported in shorthand the testimony 11 adduced and proceedings had thereat; that I thereafter, from 12 the shorthand record made by me at said hearing, prepared a typewritten transcript of said testimony and proceedings; that 13 14 the foregoing pages numbered 14 through 3060 and 3071 through 15 3141 constitute said transcript and that said transcript contains a full, true, complete and correct transcript of 16 17 said testimony and proceedings. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18 22 NO day of September 19 20 21 22

23

24

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	
3	STATE OF IDAHO
4	STATE OF IDAHO ) SS. COUNTY OF ADA )
5	
6	I, Harry H. Englund, Official Court Reporter of the
7	District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
8	Idaho, hereby certify:
9	That I attended the trial of the above-entitled matter
10	and reported in shorthand the testimony adduced and
11	proceedings had thereat; that I thereafter, from the shorthand
12	record made by me at said trial, prepared a typewritten
13	transcript of said testimony and proceedings; that the
14	foregoing 10 pages constitute said transcript and that said
15	transcript contains a full, true, complete and correct
16	transcript of said testimony and proceedings.
17	IN WITNESS WHEREOF:
18	IN WITNESS WHEREOF:  I have hereunto set my hand this 38 day of Guyust, 1976
19	
20	11 , 4 0 -
21	Horry N. English
22	OFFICIAL REPORTER
23	
24	
25	

## 1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 2 3 STATE OF IDAHO ) ) ss. 4 County of Ada 5 6 I, MICHELLE BARTLETT, Official Court Reporter of the 7 District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of 8 Idaho, hereby certify: 9 That I attended the Initial Arraignment of the 10 avove-entitled matter and reported in shorthand the testimony 11 adduced and proceedings had thereat; that I thereafter, from 12 the shorthand record made by me at said proceeding, prepared a 13 typewritten transcript of said testimony and proceedings; 14 that the foregoing pages numbered 4 through 13, inclusive 15 constitute said transcript and that said transcript contains 16 a full, true, complete and correct transcript of said 17 testimony and proceedings. 18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this SOTA day of September, 1976. 19 20 21 22 23 24